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Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in South Africa 
 
Johann Kirsten, Lawrence Edwards and Nick Vink 
 
 
The Union of South Africa was formed in 1910 out of combining the two British colonies 
(the Cape and Natal) with the defeated Boer republics (Transvaal and the Orange Free State). 
In the ensuing years, the South African Parliament set about consolidating legislation from 
the four component territories and introducing new legislation, among others in agriculture 
(Vink and van Zyl 1998). In agriculture, for example, the Land Bank was established under 
its own legislation in 1912 out of similar institutions that had existed in the four territories. 
Just a year later the first of the notorious Land Acts was promulgated, not only to proscribe 
black land ownership but also to outlaw labor tenancy and sharecropping. These laws set the 
scene for an approach to agricultural policy that was to dominate the sector over at least the 
next seven decades, namely increasing support to white commercial farmers and decreasing 
opportunities for black farmers.
1 The structural dualism that resulted still exists today after 
more than a decade of democracy. 
Between 1910 and 1935, 87 Acts were passed that allowed the State to assist farmers 
(Minnaar 1990). For example in 1912, the year of the establishment of the Land Bank, the 
Land Settlement Act was also promulgated. Its purpose was to regulate the settlement of 
white farmers on state owned land, and to enable the state to purchase further land for such 
settlement (Grobler 1988), a process that was to last until after World War II. This was 
followed in 1922 by the Cooperative Societies Act, aimed at securing input supply and 
marketing services for farmers through legislation that favored cooperatives by limiting their 
tax liability and introducing the concept of „forced cooperation‟ to enable them to manage 
free riding. It is estimated that the state spent £112 million on agriculture between 1910 and 
1936, and a further £11 million on export subsidies between 1931 and 1937 (de Kiewiet 1942). 
The year 1937 saw the advent of the Marketing Act, under whose auspices more than 
70 percent of total agricultural output was controlled until 1996, when the new Marketing of 
                                                 
1 Because this chapter focuses on the commercial farming sector, the focus in the discussion falls on those 
policies that affected the sector more directly, i.e. on those policies that favored white commercial farming. 
For a more exhaustive discussion of the interplay of policy effects between commercial and „subsistence‟ 
farming, see Vink and Van Zyl (1998).   
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Agricultural Products Act was promulgated by the democratic government. The Marketing 
Act of 1937 (later consolidated in a new Act in 1968) sanctioned different types of marketing 
schemes for different agricultural commodities. The powers available under these schemes 
included monopoly buying, single channel exports, control over agro-processing, and 
quantitative controls over imports. Of the commodities included in the present study, only 
poultry meat escaped this form of control, while the sugar industry was regulated under its 
own legislation. 
The main impetus for this agricultural policy was aptly summarized in the Union of 
South Africa White Paper (1946): 
"Farming has been our traditional occupation and it still sustains three-fifths of the 
population. The industry is therefore of great economic importance. It is of similar 
importance nutritionally. Great distances separate us from the food exporting regions of 
the world... A large and healthy farming industry is a key factor in national security. In 
these circumstances the people of the Union have a vital interest in the farming 
industry - in its efficiency and prosperity... the farming industry is in large part unable 
to stand up to overseas competition, the real test of efficiency in normal market 
conditions. The production of wheat, sugar, maize, dairy, wine, tobacco has expanded 
chiefly under the stimulus of heavy protection. Even so in bad seasons total production 
falls short of the effective demand. Nor does the industry in its present state provide 
reasonable living conditions for the bulk of farmers and farm workers…” 
 
After 1955 the story of agricultural policy towards commercial farmers involved 
widespread support, regulation and control in a climate of increasing isolation from the rest 
of the world, especially in the 1980s, followed by rapid deregulation and trade liberalization 
during the course of the 1990s with the advent of democratization and the terms of the 
Marrakech Agreement. It is this period that is the focus of the rest of this chapter. 
 
 
Economic performance of South African agriculture since 1955 
 
 
The growth performance of South African agriculture is characterized by distinct periods, 
which correspond with the policy periods described in the next section. During the 1950s and 
1960s, as the South African government invested in agricultural research, extension services,  
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rural infrastructure and settlement of farmers, agricultural output gradually started to grow. 
Guaranteed markets and guaranteed prices for most farm commodities assisted the growth in 
the sector. The 1970s was also a period of rapid growth in the economy assisted by high gold 
prices and high agricultural growth, but the oil crisis in the mid-1970s negatively affected 
economic growth in the late 1970s/early 1980s. Direct government transfers to farmers plus 
highly supported farm prices assisted agricultural growth in the late 1980s and pushed it back 
to the level of the early 1970s. The massive drought in the early 1990s, market liberalization, 
and the instability before and immediately after the 1994 elections all negatively affected 
growth opportunities in the sector. It was only after confidence in the democratic change was 
restored, and with a weakening exchange rate and thus higher commodity prices and export 
earnings, that agricultural growth marginally increased in the post-Apartheid period. 
Relative to the rest of the economy, however, the share of agriculture, forestry and 
fisheries in GDP declined steadily from 1955 to its current level of less than 4 percent. The 
mining sector has also experienced a decline in its relative share of GDP, but so has 
manufacturing. Services account for a steadily increasing share of GDP, as the South African 
economy has reached a relatively advanced stage of maturity (Appendix Table 1). 
Within agriculture, there has been a shift in the relative shares of livestock, field crop 
and horticultural production. The livestock sector has maintained an overall share of about 45 
percent of total agricultural output, moving between 35 and 50 percent with the typical 
livestock cycle (Abstract of Agricultural Statistics 2006). However, the composition of 
livestock production has changed considerably. Beef and veal production increased from 
450,000 tons to 700,000 tons between 1970/71 and 2005/06, but its share of total meat 
production nevertheless declined from 52 percent to 39 percent over this period. Likewise, 
pork production has increased, but its share of the total has declined from 9 percent to 7 
percent, while sheep and goat meat has declined in absolute terms (from 214,000 to 112,000 
tons) and relatively (from 25 percent to 6 percent). The big shift has been to poultry meat, 
with production increasing from 121,000 tons to 862,000 tons and its share increasing from 
14 percent to 48 percent of the total. 
The composition of field crop production has not changed much over the past three 
decades: sugar cane and maize made up 59 percent of the value of production in 1970, and 
maintained that share in 2005. Production of some specialty cash crops such as cow peas, 
lentils and chicory root has virtually come to a halt, while cotton production has also declined 
considerably. 
Within the horticultural sector, fruit has increased its share of physical production  
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from 55 percent to 60 percent, while within that sector the share of deciduous fruit declined 
by six percentage points (from 60 percent to 54 percent of the total between 1976 and 2004) 
while the share of citrus increased to 31 percent. Subtropical fruit, and berries and summer 
fruit, maintained their relative shares of total output. 
Exports of primary agricultural products and agro-food products have also grown 
rapidly, although their share of total merchandise exports declined from approximately 18 
percent in 1975 to around 7 percent in 2004, as would be expected during the process of 
development of the economy. Exports of processed agricultural products have increased 
faster than exports of unprocessed agricultural products: the share of processed agricultural 
exports has increased from around half of total agricultural exports to around 60 percent since 
the 1980s. 
Agricultural imports have also risen and at a faster rate than other imports or 
agricultural exports. Agricultural imports have more than doubled their share of total imports 
into the country over the past two decades, from 2.6 percent to 5.4 percent. During this 
period, imports increased from 6.2 percent of total agricultural output to more than a fifth 
(22.6 percent) of output. As a result, import cover (the ratio of agricultural exports to 
agricultural imports, a measure of the ability of the agricultural sector to pay for its own 
imports) has declined drastically from 5.6:1 to 1.35:1. The main reason for the rapid increase 
in imports is the emergence of animal feeds, especially poultry feed, as South Africa‟s main 
agricultural import item. Along with this has been the emergence of Argentina as the single 
largest source of agricultural imports. 
The export composition and export orientation of agriculture has also shifted over this 
period. South Africa is generally a net importer of meat, and is an exporter of field crops in 
some years. Maize exports have remained relatively stable, but as production has risen the 
share of maize output that is exported has declined from between 30 and 40 percent of the 
total harvest in the 1970s and 1980s to between 10 and 20 percent over the first five years of 
the present decade. In the case of horticulture, there has been a considerable shift in export 
orientation: the share of production exported has increased from around 24 percent to 32 
percent over the past three decades. Within deciduous fruit there has been a relative shift 
away from apples towards apricots, table grapes, pears, peaches and plums, while with citrus 
the relative shift has been away from grapefruit and lemons. South Africa has traditionally 
only exported avocados from among the subtropical fruits, and the proportion of the total 




Nevertheless, the country‟s export portfolio has not changed much for more than a 
century. Traditionally, wine, fruit, sugar, maize, wool, and hides and skins were exported, 
mainly to the UK and other parts of Europe. These items made up 72 percent of total 
agricultural exports on average between 2002 and 2004 (up from around 45 percent in 1972), 
while the EU remains the largest export destination, taking more than 40 percent of exports. 
South Africa‟s second largest agricultural export market is SADC, accounting for almost 20 
percent of total agricultural exports.  
Total farm employment increased until the early 1970s, after which it started a long 
decline (Appendix Table 1). In 1955, agricultural employment still represented more than 25 
percent of total formal sector employment in the country (Vink and Kirsten 1999), but it was 
less than 10 percent at the time of the last census in 2002. However, these data hide the 
relative shares of permanent and seasonal labor. The trend towards horticultural production is 
expected to result in a swing to more seasonal workers, as harvesting in this sector is still 
largely done by hand. 
 
 
Agricultural policy  
 
 
State support to commercial farmers increased until around 1980, with the deployment of a 
host of legal and other policy instruments that affected the prices of and access to natural 
resources, finance, capital inputs and labor, as well as access to local and foreign markets. 
The extent of the direct subsidies granted is reflected in Appendix Table 2.  
 
Policies to 1980 
 
The main features of the commercial agricultural sector after the World War II were the 
mechanization of commercial farming, the consolidation of marketing schemes and increased 
pressure on food production in the homelands. Regarding the former, the experience in the 
maize farming areas tells the story of capital and labor substitution in agriculture (De Klerk 
1983). 
The total number of farm employees in South African agriculture grew to 1970. 
Although this corresponded with increased mechanization following the large scale 
introduction of tractors, an increase in area planted led to increased demand for labor to  
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harvest the bigger crop. Employment then fell between 1970 and 1980, although farm 
employment was still higher in 1980 than it had been in 1950. The turning point around 1970 
coincides with the introduction in the late 1960s of combine harvesters, stimulated by 
preferential tax treatment. De Klerk (1983) shows that the share of the maize crop that was 
harvested with combine harvesters grew from 16 percent in 1968 to 81 percent by 1977. This 
period simultaneously saw the highest rates of forced removal of permanent labor from farms 
and an increasing use of temporary or seasonal labor, most of whom were women and 
children (Marcus 1989). 
Other features of the commercial farm sector in the post war period include the 
tightening of control over prices and the movement of produce in terms of the Marketing Act, 
and an increase in subsidies to white farmers. The latter was partly direct budgetary transfers 
for disaster relief, irrigation infrastructure, water subsidies, research, etc., as well as through 
price policy and interest rate subsidies.  
South Africa used the full range of policy instruments to support commercial farmers, 
including direct subsidies (mostly on the use of capital state support of research and extension, 
and regulatory instruments to ensure health, safety and the protection of natural agricultural 
resources. Yet the most important instrument used was marketing intervention, mainly through 
the Marketing Act. This enabling legislation set out the conditions under which farmers or the 
Minister of Agriculture could set up a marketing scheme, to be administered by a Control 
Board. The powers of the Board were selected from among those allowed under the Act, while 
farmers were guaranteed a majority of the seats on the Board. By the 1970s more than 20 
Boards were in operation, covering some 80 percent of total agricultural production. 
The maize, red meat and deciduous fruit export schemes are discussed below to 
illustrate the working of the specific control measures selected by each, as well as the economic 
consequences of these schemes.
2  
 
The maize scheme 
Until the late 19
th century sorghum was the most prevalent starchy staple consumed in Southern 
Africa. However, white maize superseded sorghum as traditional economies became 
monetized, largely because maize production and preparation places fewer demands on 
available household time (Low 1986). The result is that the demand for maize in Southern 
Africa differs from the rest of the world‟s because of the relatively large human consumption of 
                                                 
2 These sections borrow heavily from Vink (1999).  
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white maize. Thus it was easier for the Maize Board to justify a control regime that precluded 
imports as far as possible in the name of food self-sufficiency.  
Maize marketing was controlled under a single-channel, fixed-price regime. The Maize 
Board was the sole buyer and seller of maize at a price fixed annually by the parliament‟s 
Cabinet. Annual surveys of average production costs by the Department of Agriculture were 
used as the basis for the price (thus the farmers‟ selling price to the Maize Board was set at 
average production cost plus a profit margin, while the Board‟s selling price to millers was its 
buying price plus a margin that covered handling, storage and transport). The Board appointed 
agents to purchase maize from farmers on their behalf, and to store and distribute the produce 
to millers. The Board usually appointed a cooperative to act as its agent, with the result that the 
cooperatives gained regional monopoly powers.  
 
The buying and selling price of maize was fixed regardless of when and where maize 
was delivered (i.e. pan-territorial and pan-seasonal pricing.) The Board also controlled imports 
and exports. A stabilization fund was set up to defray expenses in times when surpluses had to 
be exported at a lower world price, and to deposit profits in times of shortage when the Board 
could import at a lower world price. In practice, the Board set buying and selling prices in such 
a way that the stabilization fund was perpetually in arrears. During the late 1970s and the 
1980s, the Board exported some maize every year and the weighted average of maize domestic 
prices remained above the export realization price. The pan-territorial pricing regime meant that 
transport costs of those farmers who delivered maize from distant areas were subsidized by 
farmers closer to the market. The transport system was expected to transport raw commodities 
rather than processed foods, thereby increasing the cost structure of the system as a whole. 
Millers paid the same price regardless of the location of their plant. Over time, therefore, the 
agribusiness sector gravitated towards the main urban areas, thereby depriving the rural areas of 
an important source of economic activity. 
 
The red meat scheme  
The per capita consumption of beef and veal in South Africa decreased from 36kg in 1948/49 
to 22kg in 1980/81, while that of poultry increased from 2.2kg to 12kg over the same period 
(Nieuwoudt 1985). Thus, any policy intervention that resulted in an artificial increase in the 
price of red meat would favor the poultry industry. The red meat scheme did precisely that: by 
restricting sales of red meat, it contributed to the rise in popularity of its greatest competitor. 
Formally, the red meat scheme was classified as a „surplus removal scheme‟, as the  
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main instrument used was a minimum price that was set by the Meat Board in order to stabilize 
the price by removing short term surpluses and adding supply to the market in times of 
shortages. Again the Board frequently could not resist the temptation to set the minimum price 
above the market-clearing level, with the result that additional intervention was required to 
manage the resultant over-supply on the market. To this end, the Board divided the country into 
controlled and non-controlled areas, where the former covered the areas of greatest demand, i.e. 
the main metropolitan markets. At the same time the requirements for the erection of abattoirs 
were tightened, with the result that most of the smaller facilities in the country were closed 
down. Permits or quotas were required of any producer who wished to sell red meat into the 
controlled market.  
The economic consequences of the scheme are clear. As large producers (mostly 
feedlots) were more likely to gain access to quotas or permits, they were able to capture the 
economic rents arising from the difference in price in the controlled and uncontrolled areas by 
buying stock in the countryside and selling it in the towns and cities. Thus, the largest effect of 
the intervention lies in the redistribution of wealth towards larger producers (and speculators) 
and away from smaller producers. Since larger producers were more likely to have their 
interests represented in the Board, these economic consequences become something of a self-
fulfilling prophecy. As a result, „informal‟ or unrecorded sales of red meat into the poorer urban 
areas had become almost the norm rather than the exception by the 1980s (Karaan and 
Myburgh 1993). 
 
The deciduous fruit scheme  
South African fruit exports started in the early 1890s, and apple exports had reached 170,000 
tons per annum by 1975, compared to 50,000 tons from a country such as Chile. However, 
Chilean apple exports grew by some 800 percent from 1975 to 1995, compared to the 
approximately 66 percent growth in South African exports. 
  One of the main differences in the marketing regime between South Africa and Chile 
was the extent of state intervention in this country. Here, deciduous fruit and citrus were 
marketed under a „single channel pool scheme‟ where the respective Boards or their agent 
were the sole buyer of fruit for the export market, and therefore the sole seller in the export 
market. The produce of farmers was pooled, and the proceeds divided on the basis of the 
quantity delivered to the pool. Therefore, farmers who delivered produce that was lower than 
average quality were favored, while those that delivered higher than average quality were 
discriminated against.   
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  These monopolistic arrangements probably inhibited growth in the volume of exports. 
The marketing scheme could have had this effect in a number of ways: 
  The South African deciduous fruit industry traditionally focused on selling only the 
best quality under the „Cape‟ trademark, with the result that price premiums of up to 
30 percent were regularly achieved. However, this had to be at the expense of volume. 
  South African exporters had to finance the facilities required to move their produce 
from the farm to the respective Boards themselves. The considerable investment in 
packing houses, combined with relatively high interest rates, limited the amount of 
investment funds available for the expansion of production. 
  South Africa was relatively unsuccessful at exploiting new markets, with only a small 
proportion of exports going to non-traditional markets such as in Asia and the Middle 
East, compared to Chile which sells about a third of its export crop in these markets. 
Again, it could be argued that a monopoly exporter would not be sufficiently flexible 
to be able to exploit such niche markets. 
  A further result of the concentration of exports to a few traditional markets, and South 
Africa‟s isolation from the world market, was the relative lack of effort given to the 
development of new cultivars in the period before 1990. Hence the country‟s fruit 
growers have been at a competitive disadvantage with respect to changing tastes 
abroad. 
 
A broadening of the policy focus 
Four events between 1973 and 1976 created a security crisis in South Africa (Vink and 
Schirmer 2002). These included labor unrest and „unlawful‟ strikes by black trade unions in 
the Durban region in 1973; the OPEC oil crisis of 1973; the coup d' etat in Lisbon in April 
1974 that resulted in the abortive invasion of Angola by South Africa in 1975; and the 
Soweto unrest of June 1976. Desperate attempts by the ruling elite to maintain the existing 
order lasted for less than 20 years after these events, and were doomed to failure. By 1976 the 
economy had moved into recession, which turned into a period of prolonged stagflation that 
lasted until 1994. Terreblanche (1998) shows that, over time, the National Party shifted from 
an exclusive focus on the interests of Afrikaners to a broader focus on the interests of whites. 
The impact of agricultural policy in the period leading up to 1980 was summarized by Vink 
(1993) as follows: 
“This combination of segregation of land ownership and a two-track approach to access to  
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support services had a number of major effects on the farming sector. First, it resulted in 
extraordinary institutional duplication with attendant high fiscal cost … South Africa ended 
up with 11 Departments of Agriculture by 1980 (14 by 1984) … Second, it created 'two 
agricultures' … which differed in access to land and support services, productivity, etc…  
Third, it created the anomaly of a country that regularly exported food 'surpluses' while most 
of the population lived well below minimum levels of living. In addition, the food self-
sufficiency index showed exports of field crops and imports of red meat while the country 
has a poor arable resource base … Fourth, for much of this period farm input prices were 
rising faster than product prices despite attempts to keep domestic prices above parity with 
imports. Fifth, there was much evidence of severe environmental damage to fragile land 
resources in both the commercial farming areas and the homelands … Sixth, the 
combination of subsidies and distortive price policies led to high rates of growth in farm 
land prices. By the beginning of the 1980s the farm sector had become inflexible and it has 
been argued that these farm policies made the sector particularly vulnerable to the disastrous 
drought that struck the subcontinent in the early 1980s … Seventh, the processes of forced 
removals and homeland consolidation created a high level of uncertainty among individual 
farmers, both black and white, as to the protection of existing property rights, with 
predictable economic consequences in some of the ecologically most vulnerable parts of the 
country.” 
 
Policies during the 1980s 
 
Financing and assistance formed one of the three pillars on which the Ministry of 
Agriculture‟s policy of „optimum agricultural development‟ (as defined in the 1984 White 
Paper (RSA 1984)) was based. The other two were optimum agricultural resource utilization 
and orderly marketing and price stabilization. Agricultural financing was considered an 
important third pillar in view of the risks inherent to agriculture in South Africa‟s relatively 
unsuitable climate. This, according to the government of the day, necessitated special 
financing facilities to create confidence in the industry and to give it the necessary stability.  
Agricultural financing programs were provided through the Land Bank, commercial 
banks, other private financiers including the agricultural co-operatives, and finally the funds 
supplied under the Agricultural Credit Act, 1966. Funds were made available under this Act 
to provide for assistance to the less well-off farmers to acquire land, and to provide 
production loans. These programs are summarized in Appendix Table 3.  
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During this period, marketing policy started to shift quite radically, although within 
the framework of the Marketing Act and the Control Boards that constituted its institutional 
infrastructure. Vink (1993) argues that these changes came about as a result of 
macroeconomic pressures. South Africa‟s macroeconomic policy changed in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s from a focus on non-market controls over monetary policy toward market-
oriented controls (Strydom 2002). Monetary policy reforms were led by the submission of the 
report of the De Kock Commission (1985) which, through its interim reports, had already 
stimulated a shift away from interest rate controls, liquid asset requirements and cash reserve 
requirements as the main instruments of monetary policy. 
The example of the Land and Agricultural Bank is relevant here, as it was allowed to 
sell scrip of up to three years‟ duration under the definition of „liquid assets‟. This enabled 
the Land Bank to pass on these lower borrowing costs to its clients, the commercial farmers, 
without requiring a direct subsidy from the taxpayer. 
Financial sector liberalization preceded the deregulation of the real sector of the 
economy. One of the results was to allow the free floating exchange rate to depreciate in 
order to stimulate exports, while import replacement policies were still in place in the 
manufacturing sector. Fiscal policy was no more successful. Its main feature was the rising 
cost of maintaining the apartheid system (Strydom 2002). This was reflected in an increase in 
current expenditure as a proportion of GDP, the growing cost of homeland governments and 
increased spending on security (military and police), and a high tax burden. One important 
consequence was that the budget deficit reached a peak of 7.3 percent of GDP in 1993 
(Strydom 2002), necessitating high real interest rates. 
The most immediate effect on agriculture came from changes in the external value of 
the currency and in the interest cost of farm borrowing. As the Rand started a decade long 
decline in value, farm input prices, which have a relatively large import component, rose 
faster than farm output prices. At the same time, interest rapidly became the single largest 
cost of production in agriculture. During this period, many of the existing controls over the 
movement of labor in South Africa were also lifted, setting in motion a vast population 
movement from the farms and the homelands to the towns and cities (Urban Foundation 
1991). This was accompanied by migration of people from most parts of Southern Africa to 
the rural and urban areas of South Africa (e.g. Simkins 1993). Finally, considerable 
microeconomic deregulation took place, also starting in the late 1970s and early 1980s and 
leading to a significant increase in activity in the informal economy (Kirsten 1988, May and 
Schacter 1991, Moll 1993). One of the most visible effects was the increase in informal  
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marketing of farm products in the urban areas (Karaan and Myburgh 1993). 
Beginning in the 1980s, the agricultural authorities started with a process of deregulation 
and policy change in the farm sector. The most prominent examples include the following:
3 
  Deregulation of marketing in terms of the Marketing Act and other legislation. This 
included the elimination of restrictive registration of processors in the red meat 
industry; the abolition of most controls on domestic marketing of deciduous and citrus 
fruit; the abolition of production quotas in the wine industry; deregulation of the grain 
sorghum and leaf tobacco single channels; further envisaged deregulation of the 
mohair and maize schemes; and the eventual abolition of control schemes in the 
banana, wool, egg and chicory industries. The report of the Kassier Committee (1992) 
can be regarded as a milestone in this process.  
  Liberalization of price controls in large parts of the farm sector, again mainly in terms 
of the Marketing Act. This included the change in price setting in the grain industries 
from a cost-plus basis to market-based systems (Brand Report 1988), leading to 
substantial declines in real farm output prices. The most important reason was the 
restriction on the ability of Boards to carry losses and profits on stabilization funds 
into a following year. Further examples include the eventual abolition of price control 
of dairy products, and later of flour, meal and bread; and the termination of consumer 
price subsidies on maize meal and bread. 
  A change in tax treatment of agriculture which, among other things, reduced the 
implicit subsidy represented by income tax concessions to farmers amounting in 
1981-84 to 70 percent of their theoretical tax bill (Lamont 1990). Changes in tax 
policy also resulted in an extension, from 1 to 3 years, of the period over which 
capital purchases could be written off and restrictions on the extent to which farming 
could be used as a tax shelter for other income sources. 
  A change in direct budgetary expenditure on agriculture, including a proportionate 
increase in budgetary transfers to the Departments of Agriculture in the homelands 
and a proportionate decrease to commercial agriculture (Vink and Kassier 1991). In 
addition, there was a reduction in real spending on commercial farming during the 
1980s (Brand et al. 1992).  
  Scrapping, in 1991, of the Land Acts and related legislation that enforced the racially 
based segregation of access to land. This was the most visible of the policy changes in 
                                                 
3 This discussion draws from Vink (1993).   
 
14 
agriculture following the breaking of the political logjam in February 1990.  
  Tariffication of farm commodities, mainly because of the pressures arising from the 
Uruguay Round of the GATT.  
 
Policies since the 1990s
4 
 
Deregulation and liberalization were, therefore, a fact of life in the agricultural sector of 
South Africa during the 1980s. Yet isolation from the world market, accompanied by the 
increased isolation of the country in the social, cultural, political and intellectual spheres, 
meant that the deregulation steps that did take place were aimed at the domestic market. 
Foreign trade still largely consisted of managing imports and exports in order to manipulate 
domestic prices (e.g. maize, wheat), or of monopoly export schemes (e.g. for fruit). The steps 
that were taken were characterized by change within an existing institutional structure, as the 
main players remained in place despite the general relaxation in State intervention. This 
changed with the election of the government of national unity in 1994, although in agriculture 
at least some direct policy changes had to wait until 1996 after the withdrawal of the National 
Party from the Government of National Unity and the appointment of an ANC Minister of 
Agriculture.  
The most important policy initiatives taken subsequent to this time included land 
reform, institutional restructuring in the public sector, the promulgation of new legislation 
including the Marketing of Agricultural Products Act and the Water Act, and trade policy and 




The Marketing of Agricultural Products Act, No. 47 of 1996 changed the way in which 
agricultural marketing policy was managed in South Africa, not least by opening the sector to 
world market influences in a manner that could hardly have been anticipated a decade earlier. 
The Act, promulgated on 1 January 1997, set up the National Agricultural Marketing Council 
(NAMC), whose immediate task was to dismantle the existing Control Boards by 6 January 
1998, and subsequently to manage and monitor state intervention in the sector.  
 
                                                 
4 This section draws on Vink and Schirmer (2002). 
5 For a more detailed discussion see Kirsten and Van Zyl (1996), Vink and Kassier (1991), Vink (1993, 




The Department of Land Affairs completed the process of land reform policy design with its 
White Paper (RSA 1997) while implementation of the program had started in 1994. Land 
reform was to consist of land restitution, redistribution and tenure reform programs. A large 
proportion of the analytical work that supported the policy positions taken during these 
debates was subsequently published in Van Zyl et al. (1996). The program was designed 
more or less in accordance with the market-assisted approach recommended by the World 
Bank (1993). In practice, however, beneficiary households usually had to pool their meager 
(means-tested) grants to afford land from a willing seller. The reason was at least partly due 
to the fact that the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act (No. 70 of 1970) had yet to be 
repealed, which would have enabled the sub-division of farms into affordable pieces of land.  
At the end of the decade, a new approach, termed the Land Reform for Agricultural 
Development (LRAD) program, was adopted (LRAD 2000). This provided for an extended 
scale of grants, dependent on an increasing own-contribution. At the same time the 
Comprehensive Agricultural Support Program (CASP) was launched. Its purpose was to 
implement farmer support services such as research, extension, finance, information and 
infrastructure. 
The net effect of the land reform program has, however, been limited. After 12 years 
of state-sponsored land reform, less than 4 percent of the land had been transferred.  
 
Institutional restructuring in the public sector 
One of the main features of South African agricultural policy in the 1990s was the extent of 
institutional restructuring that took place. Some institutions (e.g., the Development Bank, the 
Land Bank, the Agricultural Research Council, the Department of Regional and Land Affairs, 
the Development Corporations in the former homelands) were believed to be too closely 
aligned with apartheid policies aimed at „development‟ of the former homeland areas or at 
favoring commercial farmers (Callear and Mthethwa 1996, DBSA & LAPC 1997). Such 
institutions were subjected to restructuring programs aimed at realigning them to a new 
mandate in support of the development priorities of the new government.  
Also, public sector agencies supporting the agricultural sector were subjected to the 
same processes of „provincialization‟ that came about with the adoption of the interim and the 
final Constitution. In the case of agriculture, the former „own‟ and „general affairs‟ 
departments were amalgamated to form the core of the new National Department of  
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Agriculture, there was a redeployment of functions and staff from the former homeland 
Departments of Agriculture to the new National Department and to the new Provincial 
Departments, and the new Provincial Departments of Agriculture were established. All 
agricultural institutions in the public sector were reoriented to fit in with new policy 
directions. The most radical of these changes occurred in the agricultural marketing 
institutions. 
 
Water law reform 
Changes resulting from the new Water Act (No. 36 of 1996) that were expected to impact 
most severely on agriculture include the higher priority afforded to water used by humans, 
including preferential access for small farmers and the environment, the termination of the 
riparian principle of water rights, the implementation of an integrated catchment management 
system, the termination of subsidized water prices and greater cross-border co-operation 
between Southern African countries. Slow progress in the implementation of the Act has, 
however, minimized the impact to date. 
 
Labor market policy 
Until the 1980s, farm workers in South Africa had little legal protection of their rights to 
organize and to basic conditions of employment. The Agricultural Labour Act, No. 147 of 
1993, addressed this shortcoming to some extent, but it was only after 1994 that farm worker 
rights were brought into line with workers elsewhere in the economy. Henceforth, the four 
major labor laws in South Africa, including the Labour Relations Act (1995), the Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act (1997), the Skills Development Act (1998) and the 
Employment Equity Act (1998), also applied to the agricultural sector. One consequence has 
been the adoption of a minimum wage, differentiated by region, for farm workers.  
 
Trade policy  
Quantitative restrictions, a multitude of tariff lines, a wide dispersion of tariff rates, and 
formula, specific and ad valorem duties and surcharges, characterized South Africa‟s trade 
regime before 1994 (Lewis 2001, Edwards 2005). In agriculture, quantitative restrictions, 
specific duties, price controls, import and export permits and other regulations were replaced 
by tariffs after South Africa became a signatory to the Marrakech Agreement following the 
GATT‟s Uruguay Round. Surcharges implemented in response to the balance of payments 
crisis in the late 1980s were also reduced and eliminated by 1995. The one exception to this  
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process of liberalization is the sugar industry, where a price pooling system remained and the 
South African Sugar Association continued to be the only sugar exporter (OECD 2006).  
South Africa also engaged in a number of bilateral and regional trade agreements. The 
three most important trade relations in the Southern African region include SACU, which 
exhibits the deepest level of integration, SADC, and the South Africa-Zimbabwe bilateral 
agreement. Of the extra-regional influences, the Lomé (and then Cotonou) preferences, the 
Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) of the United States, and South Africa‟s 
separate bilateral Agreement with the EU are most influential.  
Initial progress in rationalizing the tariff regime and lowering nominal and effective 
protection was fast. Between 1990 and 1999, the number of tariff lines was reduced from 
12,500 in 200 tariff bands to 7743 in 47 tariff bands or fewer than 2500 in 45 bands if the 
zero tariffs are ignored. The maximum existing tariff was also reduced from almost 1400 
percent to 55 percent and the average economy-wide tariff fell from 28 percent to 7.1 percent, 
although a number of tariff peaks remain. For example, tariffs in excess of 25 percent (and up 
to 45 percent) can be found on various meat products, tobacco, refined sugar and beverages. 
Nevertheless, virtually all tariffs in agriculture are now below the bound rates of the 
Marrakech Agreement. 
The structure of protection also affects agriculture. Tariffs on primary agriculture and 
other primary products are relatively low compared to tariffs on processed foods and other 
manufacturing. This cascading tariff structure, which is typical of protection in many 
developing countries, implies that less progress has been made in reducing the dispersion of 
effective rates of protection.  
 
State support to agriculture 
State spending on the farm sector, measured as the budgeted amounts for the national 
Department of Agriculture plus the agricultural budgets of the nine provinces, amounted to 
R2.8bn in 1998. In real terms, this was 46 percent of the budget of the Department of 
Agriculture plus that of the budgets of the former homeland departments in 1988. The decline 
in state spending is also illustrated by the rapid decline of government funding of agricultural 
research. Base line funding for agricultural research provided by government through the 
parliamentary grant system dropped from a high of R337 million in 1997/98 to R262 million 
in 2001/2002 – equivalent to only 55 percent in real terms of the parliamentary grant it 





Direct and indirect distortions facing producers and consumers 
 
 
The focus of this section is on the description and presentation of the changing extent of 
direct distortions faced by producers and consumers since the mid-1950s. The main focus of 
the present study‟s methodology (Anderson et al. 2008) is on government-imposed 
distortions that create a gap between domestic prices and what they would be under free 
markets. Since it is not possible to understand the characteristics of agricultural development 
with a sectoral view alone, the project‟s methodology not only estimates the effects of direct 
agricultural policy measures (including distortions in the foreign exchange market), but it 
also generates estimates of distortions in non-agricultural sectors for comparative evaluation.
  
More specifically, this study computes a Nominal Rate of Assistance (NRA) for 
farmers including an adjustment for direct interventions on inputs. It also generates an NRA 
for nonagricultural tradables, for comparison with that for agricultural tradables via the 
calculation of a Relative Rate of Assistance (RRA).  
Distortion estimates are calculated for approximately 80 percent of field crops and 
animal products (excluding fresh milk and eggs) and 65 percent of horticultural products 
(excluding vegetables). Distortion estimates are also calculated for related lightly processed 
products (wheat and maize flour, refined sugar and sunflower oil).
6  
Some caution is required in interpreting the results presented below. Our distortion 
estimates are very volatile, reflecting volatile exchange rates and imperfect pass-through to 
domestic prices. Further, identifying appropriate international prices and transport and 
marketing margins proved difficult. For example, at times we find sudden switches from 
positive to negative nominal rates of assistance on import-competing products, without a 
concomitant change in agricultural policy.
7 While this can be ameliorated through 
adjustments to margins, the quality coefficient or international reference prices, we have 
chosen not to do so, as this may induce further ad hoc misrepresentations to the existing data. 
                                                 
6 To estimate the average distortion for all lightly processed products, we use the NRAs of products directly 
calculated in this study to estimate distortions for similar processed products not covered in this project. The 
products covered in this manner are as follows: slaughtering and preserved meat (weighted average NRA 
poultry, beef, mutton), vegetable and animal oils (sunflower oil), sugar products (refined sugar), sugar 
confectionary (refined sugar), prepared animal feed, grain mill products and bakery products (weighted 
average wheat and maize flour). Production values (at distorted prices) based on Input-Output tables are used 
as weights. Bracketed terms reflect the calculated NRA used to estimate processed NRA. Distortions in the 
highly processed beverages and tobacco products are not accounted for. 
7 A domestic subsidy is consistent with negative direct rates of assistance on import competing products.   
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Also, not all data series were available from 1955, and a consistent database could be 
constructed only from 1965. 
The analytical narrative of the changes in distortions presented below should be read 
in the context of the main policy shifters presented in the earlier sections of the chapter. As a 
reminder, the major structural changes were initiated sequentially by first the initial voting 
power of white farmers, then the impact of the sanctions era (especially on exports), then the 
effect of democratization, and most recently the impact of multilateral trade liberalization. 
The trend in the calculated NRA for primary agricultural products covered in this 
study is presented in Figure 1. Figure 2 compares the NRA for the agricultural sector and the 
non-agricultural tradable sectors.
8 The five year averages of these data are presented in 
Tables 1 and 2, respectively. 
 
Nominal rates of assistance to agriculture 
 
The estimates of the total NRA for farmers include the direct transfers that are summarized in 
Appendix Table 2. All these support programs were suspended more or less at the time of the 
democratic transition in 1994/95. The extent of direct subsidization to commercial farmers 
was at its height during the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s. On average, estimates of the NRA 
in agriculture reflect a change in policy from one that was anti-trade in the 1970s and 1980s 
to more-liberal markets in the 1990s, following reductions in both import protection and 
export taxation. The five-year average NRA for primary agriculture rose to a peak of 31 
percent between 1980 and 1984, but then fell to less than 10 percent in the 1990s and close to 
zero since then. This is consistent with the abolition of the Control Boards and trade 
liberalization under the Marrakech Agreement on Agriculture.  
There is substantial variation within these five-year averages. As shown in the annual 
data presented in Figure 1, the average NRA for agriculture moved from slightly negative to 
slightly positive in the period 2000-04. The rise reflects to a large extent a relatively slow 
pass-through of currency shocks to producer prices during this period. The post-2000 period 
in South Africa is characterized by a substantial and rapid depreciation of the Rand, from 
R6.9 per US$ in 2000 to 10.54 R/US$ in 2002, and a subsequent appreciation to 6.46 R/US$ 
in 2004. Domestic prices of some agricultural products, particularly processed products such 
as bread and maize flour, appear to be sticky downwards during periods of declining 
                                                 
8 The lack of product-specific distortions in input costs implies that the NRA to farm production is equal to 
the nominal rate of assistance (NRA) to farm output.  
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agricultural input prices (Cutts and Kirsten 2006), resulting in relatively large increases in 
measured NRA. The post-2004 depreciation can be expected to have reduced the rise in NRA 
for the agricultural sector during 2000-04. 
Some variations in the trend level of distortions are also evident across importable and 
exportable products. With quantitative import controls in place for most of the period 
between 1960 and 1994, the positive NRAs on importables shown in Figure 1 are not 
unexpected. These drop from an average of 10-21 percent in the 1980s to close to zero 
percent in the period 1995-2005, reflecting the demise of the Control Boards and the 
liberalization phase as South Africa complied with the requirements of the Agreement on 
Agriculture. In all cases, except for poultry, the average NRA in the period 2000-04 was 
lower than the average during the 1980s. The trend in NRA is, however, volatile during the 
1990s and early 2000s, reflecting an imperfect pass-through of the exchange rate to domestic 
prices as well as changes in the composition of exportables and importable products.
9  
Sugar products (sugar cane and refined sugar) are found to have NRA values in 
excess of 40 percent for many periods. This can be attributed to high tariff protection as well 
as a pricing mechanism enabling import parity pricing despite being an export product. More 
generally, NRAs are volatile over time, especially during the 1970s and 1980s when the 
government attempted to smooth domestic farm-gate prices. With smoothed domestic prices, 
international price and exchange rate volatility leads to volatility in the distortion estimates. 
The dispersion of NRAs among covered products has, however, declined since the early 
1980s (see near bottom of Table 1). This is consistent with the shift to a more market oriented 
agricultural policy. 
The picture for exportables could be confusing, given the high levels of average 
support of over 35 percent in the 1980s and 1990s. In this regard, it is important to recall the 
dominance of yellow maize and fresh fruit in South Africa‟s export portfolio up to 1995. 
After 1995, as deregulation and liberalization measures were introduced, the export portfolio 
shifted, and all measures to support exports and export losses were abolished. The peak of the 
NRA series for exportables in 1985-89 can be explained by the large maize exports at a huge 
loss. Much of this can be attributed to the decline in the world price (33 percent decline from 
1985-87), but a rise in the domestic price (44 percent from 1985-87).  
The large losses recorded in the exports of surplus yellow maize resulted in large 
                                                 
9 For example, yellow maize was an importable product with a negative NRA for the period 2002-04, but 




shortfalls in the Maize Board‟s stabilization fund. The government bailed out the Maize 
Board with a payment of R400 million to cover the shortfall, but then indicated that this will 
not be repeated. As a result the Maize Board changed its price policies to a single channel 
pool marketing scheme (from a single channel fixed price scheme) to ensure that shortfalls on 
the stabilization did not re-occur. Given the size of this sector, it caused a substantial increase 
in the aggregate NRA for exported agricultural products in this period. The relatively high 
NRA for exported products in the early 1990s is largely due to sugar cane, where stagnant 
world prices and a sharp increase in domestic cane prices (the domestic price more than 
doubled between 1988 and 1992) led to high rates of assistance. The decline in the five-year 
average NRA in the post-2000 period arises from relatively large declines in the NRA for 
white maize exports.
10  
The average NRA for lightly processed food products tends to be higher than that for 
primary agriculture, but follows a similar trend for most of the period. Because we do not 
include dairy products, which have relatively high tariffs and a high Producer Support 
Estimate (OECD 2006), our NRA for lightly processed products may be biased downwards. 
NRAs for lightly processed products are generally higher in the 1980s and 1990s than the 
rates for farmers. However, a decline in distortions is also evident during the 1990s, although 
this decline has been offset by a rise from 2003. The recent increase reflects the appreciation 
of Rand (which rapidly lowered border prices), the relatively slow downwards adjustment in 
domestic prices, and the rise in the NRA for refined sugar and processed meat products. 
These increases are not associated with changes in the policy environment, hence are not 
expected to signify the start of a long-run upward trend in distortions. 
 
Relative rates of assistance 
 
A comparison of the NRA for agriculture with that for non-agricultural tradable industries 
(manufacturing, mining and highly processed agricultural products) is presented in Figure 2. 
The Relative Rate of Assistance to agriculture (RRA), also presented there, reflects the 
incentive to produce agricultural relative to non-agricultural tradable products. Both the RRA 
and the NRA measures are likely to under-estimate the actual level of distortions in the non-
agricultural industries as collection rates (import duties over merchandise import value) are 
                                                 
10 White maize is not widely traded internationally. South Africa is one of the dominant producers of white 
maize, hence domestic prices are to some extent affected by domestic supply and demand conditions. The 
international maize price is based on yellow maize (U.S. No.2 Yellow, FOB Gulf of Mexico) and may not 
adequately proxy regional price fluctuations of white maize.  
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used as the distortion measure for manufacturing.
11 As is shown in Edwards (2005), 
collection rates under-estimate protection in manufacturing, but unfortunately alternative 
measures are not available over the entire period.  
The results suggest that distortions in the agricultural tradable sector were high 
relative to non-agriculture during the 1960s, the late 1970s and the 1980s. During the 1990s, 
distortions declined in both sectors, but fell more rapidly in agriculture. The net effect was 
that by 2000-04, the incentive for resource allocation had shifted, albeit slightly, against 
agriculture and towards non-agricultural industries.  
The results of the RRA estimates in Table 2 and depicted in Figure 2 clearly reflect 
the impact of deregulation. The trend in RRA follows that of primary agriculture closely, 
reflecting the relatively low distortions estimated in the non-agricultural sectors. The low 
levels of distortion in agriculture from the mid-1990s suggest that economic policies have a 
relatively neutral impact on aggregate agricultural production on average. However, the 
significant variation of NRAs within the farm sector, with some industries being taxed and 
others being protected, suggests there is still ample scope for efficiency gains within the farm 
sector were those differences in NRAs to be phased out.  
 
Comparison with OECD’s PSEs 
 
Our estimates differ somewhat from the OECD (2006) estimates of distortions in South 
African agriculture (Appendix Table 8). Looking first at the average distortion in primary 
agriculture, we find a decline in our NRA from 1994-2003 that is consistent with the decline 
found by the OECD. The turning points are also largely consistent, except for 2000 and 2003 
when our estimates of NRA rose sharply while the OECD (2006) derived NRA fell. As 
argued above, we attribute much of the difference in 2003 to imperfect pass-through of the 
appreciation in the currency to domestic wholesale prices. We also estimate a sharper decline 
in distortions than the OECD during the period 1994-2002.  
 
There are a number of reasons as to why the distortion measures differ between the 
studies. First, we use different international reference prices for some of our products, in 
particular beef and maize. These differences are discussed in more detail in the product-
specific analysis that follows. Second, our coverage differs from the OECD. The OECD 
                                                 
11 A zero tariff on services was assumed. Production values (at distorted prices), derived from various input-
output tables were used to calculate the weighted average NRA for non-agricultural sectors.   
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study includes pork, groundnuts, eggs and dairy products. The latter is shown in the OECD 
study to have relatively high levels of distortions from 1994-97, which may account for the 
relatively larger decline in our estimates of protection during this period but not afterwards. 
Third, we have treated fruit differently: we have split apples, oranges and grapes into traded 
and non-traded products as these products are not perfectly substitutable and have very 
different prices. Finally, there are important methodological differences in how distortions 
are measured. In the OECD study, when the producer price is lower than the international 
reference price (at farm gate), a zero producer distortion is imposed. In our estimates if the 
producer price is less than the international reference price, we estimate a negative NRA. In 
the case of imports, this reflects the fact that the producer price is less than the import parity 
price. The lower domestic price may reflect quality differences, seasonal variation in 
international and domestic prices or unmeasured margins and distortions in the domestic 
market. Rather than simply imposing a zero NRA, we have left our estimates as negative in 
these cases. This difference in approach to a large extent explains the greater variation of our 
estimates compared to those of the OECD (2006). 
 
Consumer tax equivalents 
 
Appendix Figure 1 presents the three-year average consumer tax equivalent (CTE) on 
primary agricultural products and processed agricultural products. The total CTE is also 
presented. The trend in CTEs is very similar to the NRAs for each product, but the average 
level is higher, reflecting the imposition of sales tax on some food products from 1978 (GST 
up to 1991, VAT afterwards).
12 The composition of consumption also differs from 
production, with higher shares of poultry and beef in consumption than production. 
Relatively high distortions on processed products, that account for a large share of 
consumption, also raises the average CTE relative to the NRA on primary production. 
During the 1970s and 1980s consumer tax equivalents were high but, with 
liberalization in the 1990s, these distortions then declined. This was aided by the VAT zero-
rating for brown bread, brown bread flour, maize meal, fresh and frozen fruit and vegetables 
and vegetable oil from 1991. The implicit consumer subsidy for these products was 10 
                                                 
12 A 4 percent General Sales Tax was introduced June 1978. This was raised to 6 percent in 1982, 7 percent 
in February 1984, 10 percent in July 1984, 12 percent in April 1985 and 13 percent in 1989. VAT was 
introduced in Oct 1991 (10 percent) and raised to 14 percent on 7 April 1993. Zero rated products include: 
Brown bread, maize meal, samp, mealie rice, dried mealies, dried beans, lentils, pilchards, milk powder, 
milk, rice, unprocessed vegetables and fruit, vegetable oil, and eggs.  
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percent between 1 October 1991 and 7 April 1993 and 14 percent subsequently. The rise in 
CTE from 2002 reflects the imperfect pass-through of the exchange rate appreciation. The 
sharp increase compared to the RRA is due to the larger share of poultry and beef in 
consumption. The CTE (and NRA) rose for these importables relative to those for other 
products. 
 
Individual commodity NRAs 
 
In this section a brief discussion on the key features of the NRA estimates in Table 1 for each 
of the individual commodities is presented in order to highlight the impacts on the NRA 
estimates of some of the commodity specific policies.  
 
Yellow and white maize 
South Africa produces both white maize and yellow maize. The former forms an important 
component of household consumption, while the latter is an important source of feedstock. In 
our analysis we separate the two products and estimate NRAs for both. The estimated NRAs 
for yellow and white maize are shown in Appendix Figure 2. Domestic prices track the 
international reference price (U.S. No.2 Yellow, FOB Gulf of Mexico, U.S. price, US$ per 
metric tonne) well. The border price for yellow maize was adjusted to c.i.f. or f.o.b. 
Randfontein, depending on whether there were net imports or net exports in a given year. The 
reference price for white maize was treated differently.
13 South Africa is one of the main 
exporters of white maize and exports primarily to Southern and Eastern Africa, which are net 
importing regions. Hence, in years where there is a regional shortage in maize production, 
South African export prices are driven upwards to the f.o.b. border price for the region, which 
we have estimated as the c.i.f. Randfontein price.
14 This assumption mostly applies to the 
post-1990s when the SADC region was a net importer of maize. In cases where the country 
experienced white maize shortages, such as 1987/88 and 1992, yellow maize was imported.  
The trend in NRA estimates for white and yellow maize broadly follow each other, 
although the NRA for white maize is lower than for yellow maize in most periods. The 
difference in levels is partly explained by a 10 percent premium in international prices for 
                                                 
13 If we use the fob Randfontein price, we find average NRAs close to 50 percent in the post-1998 period 
where no support was granted to exporters. According to FAOSTAT data the SADC region was a net 
importer during most of this period. 
14 Foreign traders within the region purchase white maize directly from South Africa using the SAFEX wheat 
price, which is the delivered price in Randfontein.   
 
25 
white maize assumed in the calculations and by the fact that white maize producers receive 
less than the export parity and import parity prices for many of the years. The negative 
distortion on white maize in the 1970s diminished in the 1980s when together with yellow 
maize the NRA rose sharply to an average of 36 percent from 1985 to 1989 (Table 1). The 
NRA for yellow maize rose to an average of 86 percent over this period. The sharp increase 
in NRA is associated with the period 1987/88 when domestic maize prices increased while 
international prices fell and the rand appreciated after the collapse in 1985. Finally, NRAs for 
maize flour also fluctuate considerably (Appendix Figure 5). Average NRAs for maize flour 
also appear to have declined from the early 1990s, although they have risen with the 
appreciation of the currency since 2002. 
 
Wheat 
Appendix Figure 2 also presents the estimated NRAs for wheat and wheat flour. South Africa 
has been classified as a net wheat importer since the end of the 1980s. During the highly 
subsidized and protected 1970s and 1980s, South Africa exported some wheat, usually to 
neighboring countries and at a loss. The guaranteed prices established at levels higher than 
export realization were largely responsible for the high NRAs during those years. The NRA 
for wheat grain drops dramatically in the 1990s, as wheat is reclassified as an import-
competing product. The replacement of import quotas with import tariffs (measured on a 
formula based on the world price) explains the positive NRA for primary wheat of around 8 
percent from 1990.
15  
For the calculation of NRAs for wheat flour, Randfontein (where the major millers are 
located) was again used as the reference point. The most reliable estimates were obtained by 
using FAOSTAT unit export values for South African flour exports. The NRA for wheat 
flour is positive and large (average of 58 percent from 1995-2005) and also rose from the 
1980s to the 1990s. This reflects the reduction in the distortion on primary wheat during the 
1990s as well as tariff escalation and general protection on wheat flour (average of 37.5 
percent from 1996-05).  
 
Sunflower 
The traded commodity in the case of sunflower seed is sunflower oil and sunflower oil cake. 
Sunflower seed was classified as a non-tradable for the period under review. FAOSTAT trade 
                                                 
15 The NRA of virtually 0 percent in 2005 reflects the very low tariff of 2 percent imposed during this period.  
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data were used to determine whether sunflower oil should be considered an exportable or 
importable for each of the years. Crude sunflower oil export prices for Argentina 
(FAOSTAT) were used for the international reference price. The NRA results (Appendix 
Figure 2) confirm the relatively strong protection of the agro-processing sector in the earlier 
years. It was only after the initial period of deregulation and liberalization in the early 1990s 
that there has been increased competition from imported crude sunflower oil, explaining the 
lower NRAs after 1993. Average tariffs on crude sunflower oil imports fell from 33 percent 
between 1988 and 1994 to 10 percent between 1995 and 2005. 
 
Poultry  
The South African poultry industry benefited from strong import protection through tariffs 
for most of the years, hence the positive NRA‟s (Appendix Figure 3). Cheap imports of lower 
quality cuts and several cases of dumping during the late 1990s and early 2000s put the 
domestic industry under tremendous pressure. The additional imports of certain cuts and 
frozen whole birds increased domestic supply and placed downward pressure on domestic ex-
abattoir prices, causing a decline in the estimated NRA.
16 It was only after the depreciation of 
the rand in 2002 that the domestic industry was able to compete as imports became more 
expensive. However, the positive distortion remained below the average tariff rate of 27 
percent during the late 1990s.  
 
Mutton  
The NRA results for mutton (Appendix Figure 3) reflect the protection to mutton farmers by 
means of a 40 percent tariff since mid-1990s and a system of import licenses and quantitative 
import controls before 1994. Increased competition by imports but also stock theft concerns, 
as well as the instability in the years of political transition, caused a drop in production 
between 1994 and 1998, after which it stabilized. Imports also increased as a result of 
drought in 1991. Since then production has never reached earlier levels as a more open trade 
regime was introduced after 1994. Domestic prices start to follow world price trends until the 
dramatic depreciation of the exchange rate during 2001/2002, after which domestic prices 
remained below the landed prices of the equivalent product.  
 
Beef 
                                                 
16 To account for the effect of dumping and importation of low quality poultry, international prices are 
adjusted downwards using the quality adjustment (-15 percent) coefficient.  
 
27 
Selecting the appropriate international reference price for beef was a major problem in trying 
to estimate the NRA for beef, largely because South Africa imports fresh or chilled beef 
carcasses only from Botswana and Namibia (also sometimes imported on the hoof and 
slaughtered in South Africa). Since these countries are part of the Southern Africa Customs 
Union, these imports are unrecorded. In analyzing beef import trends over the last two 
decades, it is however evident that most imports are low quality frozen boneless beef mainly 
imported from the EU (especially during the 1990s) and Argentina. This product is of low 
quality and not comparable with carcass prices at South African abattoirs. In this respect this 
analysis departs from the latest OECD (2006) PSE estimates for South Africa, where 
Australian beef export prices were used as the reference price. This is higher than any other 
international reference price.  
To take account of the low quality imports and to some extent the dumping out of EU 
intervention stocks in certain years, and also to take account of the increasing dominance of 
Argentina as country of origin recently, the average between the import unit value for beef 
imports into South Africa and the international price for Argentinean beef has been used as 
the international reference price series.  
The resulting NRA therefore appropriately reflects the period of quantitative 
protection during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s (Appendix Figure 3). The lower NRA numbers 
for recent years correspond well with the period of cheap imports, a more open trade regime 
and a drop in world prices for beef at the end of the 1990s. The positive NRA in the last few 
years also corresponds with the import tariff regime of 40 percent and the application of tariff 
rate quotas which means that, depending on the country of origin, imports can be tariff free 
thus bringing about net protection of 20 percent.   
 
Table grapes 
All the fruits discussed here (grapes, apples, oranges) operated as single channel pool 
schemes up to the 1997, when all the marketing schemes were abolished. For each of the 
fruits we have calculated separate NRAs for high-quality exportable commodities and 2
nd and 
3
rd class fruits which are non-tradable. This approach differs from that followed by the OECD 
(2006). 
In the case of table grape exports, the reported export unit value for South African 
grapes was used as the international reference price (from FAOSTAT). This was then 
adjusted downwards by internal transport costs (11 percent of total freight costs), and 
compared to the reported average farmer payment, alternatively known as the export  
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realization price. This is the price paid to farmers once all the costs of the marketing board 
and its agents were accounted for. During some years, especially the early 1980s, the costs of 
sanction busting impacted negatively on farmer returns. Some windfalls through exchange 
rate depreciation are shown in the positive NRAs for 1986/87 and 2001/2002. Despite these 
outliers, the NRA trends adequately reflect the shift in policy regimes (Appendix Figure 4). 
South African export grapes used to get a premium in the European market due to 
being out of season. This was lost post-2000 due to large increases in production area and 
volume increases resulting in the market window not being exclusive any more. This change 
in market realities is reflected in the NRA results for the last few years. It could, however, be 
a concern that the NRA results are still positive in the post-1997 deregulated period when one 
would have expected NRA results to be zero. However, the positive NRA from 1997-2001 is 
consistent with the market premium noted above. From 2001 the NRA is almost zero 
(slightly negative), which is consistent with the removal of the premium.  
 
Apples  
In the case of apple exports, the fob unit value (FAOSTAT) adjusted by internal transport 
costs was also used as the international reference price. This was again compared with the 
export realization price, which confirmed that the international reference price we selected 
tracks the export realization figures reasonably well. The NRA results appear to be highly 
volatile (Appendix Figure 4), but again reflect the periods of exchange rate depreciation and 
the deregulation period fairly well. Clearer trends are provided by the decade averages in 
Table 1. During the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s farmers were on average taxed (2-4 percent) by 
the single channel export system. With market deregulation this negative distortion declined 
and the NRA averaged between 0 to 1 percent from the 1990s.  
 
Oranges 
Prices for oranges were based on the same method as the other fruit types. The resulting NRA 
estimates suggest that the single channel export scheme of oranges taxed farmers 
considerably – as much as 50 percent during the early 1970s. Outspan oranges were targeted 
world-wide during the apartheid years, and the resulting losses can be seen in the negative 
spike in 1977 (after the 1976 Soweto uprisings). When sanctions were at their height in the 
1980s the orange export industry also suffered, as shown by the negative NRAs in that 
period. The positive image of South Africa post-1994 and some exchange rate windfalls 
explain some of the positive NRAs in the latter years of the period under review. To some  
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extent the data also reflects positive gains from the deregulation process, uncoordinated 
marketing efforts and shirking behavior by many export agents who did not pass returns 
through to producers.  
 
Sugar 
Appendix Figure 4 also includes the three-year moving average NRA for sugar cane. To 
obtain the international reference price raw sugar export prices (fob from Abstract of 
Agricultural Statistics 2006) are converted to refined sugar equivalent using the average ratio 
of processed sugar exports to raw sugar exports (calculated using Customs and Excise data 
from 1988-2004). These prices are then compared with the free on rail (Durban) prices of 
refined sugar. No data are available on sugar cane export prices. These are estimated by 
adjusting the refined export price of sugar downwards using South African processing 
margins and the relevant conversion rates. 
As shown in Appendix Figures 4 and 5, high positive NRAs are obtained for both 
sugar cane and refined sugar, despite their export orientation. Under the single channel 
mechanism, which continued up to 2000, the South African Sugar Association (SASA) had 
the authority to set prices and quantities sold in the domestic and international market. 
Although the revised Sugar Industry Agreement in 2000 ended the statutory authority of 
SASA to set the industrial sugar price, a tacit local market proceeds-sharing agreement, high 
concentration in the industry, and the single channel export mechanism still enable millers to 
sell domestic sugar at import parity prices (NAMC 2003, p. 245). High domestic sugar prices 
feed into sugar cane prices through the Division of Proceeds formula, whereby revenue that 
accrues to the sugar industry is allocated to the millers and growers. The lack of trend since 
the early 1990s to some extent reflects the lack of liberalization within this sector. Average 
tariffs on refined sugar have fluctuated around 45 percent from 1993, while tariffs on sugar 
cane have remained stable at 20 percent.  
 
 
Policy reform needed to deal with existing distortions  
 
 
The results of this analysis confirm the general perception that since the mid-1990s South 
African agriculture on average has been operating in a non-distorted environment, where the 
net effect of price-distorting policies on aggregate resource use in agriculture seems to be  
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neutral. The NRA and RRA results confirm that the sector on the whole is receiving virtually 
no policy support. 
As stressed by Anderson et al. (2007), however, this does not mean that no further 
policy reforms need to be addressed. There is still considerable dispersion in NRAS within 
the farm sector, and in particular the sugar industry is still highly protected (as are the dairy 
and pigmeat industries, according to OECD 2006). High NRA are also found in the 
processing sector and reflect relatively high import tariffs on processed products and a 
potential lack of competition in the processing and retail sectors. It appears, for example that 
there was imperfect pass-through to domestic prices of processed agricultural products of the 
exchange rate appreciation from 2002, which led to significant increases in NRA and CTE 
for processed products. The implication is that the policy reforms that have concentrated on 
primary agriculture may not have adequately filtered through to consumers. This is also 
shown in the high CTE relative to NRA in primary agriculture. These conclusions are 
indicative and not conclusive, as the current study does not cover the full range of processed 
products. Nevertheless, the results suggest that the policy reform agenda should shift to the 
processing and retail sector. 
For primary agriculture the issue is to identify the policies – usually outside the ambit 
of the agricultural portfolio, such as labor legislation, land taxes, water tariffs, electricity rates 
and road and fuel taxes – that reduce incentives for agricultural production. When the general 
deterioration of infrastructure, inefficiencies in government service delivery, poor facilitation 
in trade-related matters and generally high costs of business operations are added, it is clear 






South African agriculture has been subjected to major reform over the past 25 years: from 
internal market deregulation (from the 1980s within the then-existing institutional 
framework), to liberalization of trade (after the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture in 
1994), and then to further fast-track deregulation under the new Marketing of Agricultural 
Products Act in 1997 (resulting in the abolition of the elaborate structure of commodity 
Control Boards). These events coincided with the last decade of the apartheid regime (the 
1980s), the lengthy transition to democracy (1990 to 1994), and the first years under the new  
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democratic Constitution, respectively. 
The first phase of internal market deregulation was the result of perceptions about the 
high fiscal burden of controlled agricultural marketing and about the efficiency costs of 
overregulation. Nevertheless, the institutions and mechanisms of control were kept in place. 
Trade liberalization, on the other hand, resulted directly from the new government‟s drive to 
create conditions of macroeconomic stability in the country: the impact on agriculture was, 
therefore, a side-effect of a larger policy objective. The comprehensive deregulation after 
1996 reflects the urge to complete the process of deregulation, as well as the declining 
lobbying power of the commercial farming sector. In the process, however, the mechanisms 
through which small and emerging farmers can be supported have disappeared, even though 
there is increasing pressure on the government to provide such support.  
In the light of the policy imperative for successful black economic empowerment and 
land reform, there is an important case to be made for the re-introduction of some of the 
programs implemented by the apartheid government in the 1950/60s to empower Afrikaner 
farmers. There is also a powerful imperative not to repeat the mistakes of the past: over-
reliance on the state, direct intervention in markets that create distortions, an inability to 
foresee the high fiscal costs of intervention, etc. To this end, future policies will have to 
accommodate a larger role for the private sector (commercial farmers and agribusiness), will 
have to be more market friendly, and will have to account for the country‟s obligations under 
the WTO (by using targeted „green box‟ assistance measures to support this important 
political imperative). Examples include an expansion of CASP, as provided for in the new 
Budget of the Department of Agriculture, improved access to financial services, the 
revitalization of the extension services at the provincial level, and development of irrigation 
infrastructure. Such support services would need to be targeted at emerging farmers. It is 
likely that current political economy forces favor such initiatives, but whether this will hold 
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Figure 1: Nominal rates of assistance to exportables, import-competing and all
a agricultural products, 
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a.  The total NRA can be above or below the exportable and import-competing averages 
because assistance to nontradables and non-product specific assistance is also 
included. 
 





Figure 2: Nominal rates of assistance to all nonagricultural tradables, all agricultural tradable 
industries, and relative rates of assistance
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t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural 
and nonagricultural sectors, respectively. 
 
Source: Authors‟ spreadsheet  
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Table 1: Nominal rates of assistance to covered products, South Africa, 1961 to 2005 
(percent) 
  1961-64  1965-69  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  1995-99  2000-05 
Exportables 
a  3.3  9.6  -9.4  3.7  38.2  48.5  35.3  18.1  9.5 
Sugar  32.5  43.3  -15.3  3.4  49.5  39.0  78.9  35.9  44.4 
Apple  -6.1  -4.1  2.3  -10.6  -17.3  12.9  9.0  -7.3  0.7 
Orange  -7.3  -17.9  -40.3  -28.3  -15.5  -18.2  -4.4  2.9  13.0 
Grape  -20.6  -20.6  2.8  0.2  -33.1  23.6  5.5  8.8  6.7 
                   
Import-competing products 
a  4.9  10.5  6.4  9.3  28.3  1.5  0.1  3.7  0.6 
Beef  7.3  16.4  4.2  34.6  52.2  0.9  -12.5  -0.6  -5.7 
Sheepmeat  19.5  13.6  40.1  39.0  28.3  32.4  33.1  23.4  4.1 
Poultry  -12.9  -12.9  -15.7  -23.8  18.4  -2.9  6.5  12.9  6.0 
                   
Nontradables 
a  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.9  -3.1  -6.1  -1.6  0.0  0.0 
Apple  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.6  -2.8  -6.0  -2.3  0.0  0.0 
Orange  0.0  0.0  0.0  -1.0  -3.5  -6.2  -1.0  0.0  0.0 
Grape  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.6  -2.8  -6.0  -2.3  0.0  0.0 
                   
Mixed trade status 
a,b                   
Wheat  -2.0  11.6  25.7  61.1  67.4  65.8  13.4  -0.1  7.6 
Maize (Yellow)  4.9  19.0  4.6  13.7  39.2  86.3  56.0  12.7  19.7 
Maize (White)  -10.3  0.9  -20.0  -15.8  20.0  35.8  32.6  5.0  -7.8 
Sunflower  18.9  17.7  6.2  7.2  19.9  7.4  6.9  -6.9  -2.9 
                   
Total of covered products 
a  3.3  9.5  -3.2  3.9  31.1  15.5  9.3  6.8  3.6 
Dispersion of covered products 
c  15.3  18.8  25.0  31.1  42.7  38.3  34.5  20.4  21.7 
% coverage (at undistorted prices)  68  67  69  68  64  66  68  68  69 
a. Weighted averages, with weights based on the unassisted value of production. 
b. Mixed trade status products included in exportable or import-competing groups depending upon their trade status in the particular year.  
c. Dispersion is a simple 5-year average of the annual standard deviation around the weighted mean of NRAs of covered products. 
Source: Authors‟ spreadsheet  
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Table 2: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural relative to nonagricultural industries, South Africa, 1961 to 2005 
(percent) 
   1961-64  1965-69  1970-74  1975-79  1980-84  1985-89  1990-94  1995-99  2000-05 
Covered products 
a  3.3  9.5  -3.2  3.9  31.1  15.5  9.3  6.8  3.6 
Non-covered products   -1.5  0.1  -2.9  -1.4  4.0  -2.5  2.4  -0.3  -0.9 
All agricultural products 
a  1.7  6.4  -3.3  2.1  21.2  9.0  7.0  4.4  2.0 
Non-product specific (NPS) assistance   2.4  3.0  2.5  1.7  1.7  2.7  3.8  1.3  0.1 
Total agricultural NRA (incl. NPS) 
b  4.1  9.4  -0.7  3.8  22.9  11.7  10.8  5.7  2.1 
Trade bias index 
c  0.01  0.00  -0.14  -0.03  0.07  0.40  0.33  0.13  0.11 
                   
Assistance to just tradables:                   
   All agricultural tradables  5.2  11.9  -0.7  5.2  31.7  17.5  14.6  7.9  3.2 
   All non-agricultural tradables  2.8  3.3  2.6  2.7  5.0  5.3  7.3  4.6  2.7 
Relative rate of assistance, RRA 
d  1.5  8.4  -3.1  2.4  24.4  11.3  7.2  3.7  0.1 
a. NRAs including product-specific input subsidies. 
b. NRAs including product-specific input subsidies and non-product-specific (NPS) assistance. Total of assistance to primary factors and 
intermediate inputs divided to total value of primary agriculture production at undistorted prices (percent). 
c. Trade bias index is TBI = (1+NRAagx/100)/(1+NRAagm/100) – 1, where NRAagm and NRAagx are the average percentage NRAs for the 
import-competing and exportable parts of the agricultural sector. 




t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables 
parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively.  




Quantity data for agricultural products and lightly processed foods 
Production volume data are compiled from various volumes of the Abstract of 
Agricultural Statistics issued by the Department of Agriculture. Data in some years reflected 
some inconsistencies and were adjusted after consultation with producer organizations, official 
annual reports of the various marketing boards (pre-1995) and official statistics from the South 
African Grain Information Service (SAGIS). These various sources were incorporated in more 
unified and correct database as part of the BFAP (2006) commodity market database and formed 
a key input in this study.  
Export and import volume data are from Customs and Excise and Agricultural Marketing 
Boards. 
Apparent consumption data are derived as follows: Official data from Agricultural 
Marketing Boards as well as Abstract of Agricultural Statistics and SA Grain Information 
Service (for the various grains).   
 
Farm-gate product prices  
These are from the annual reports of the various Agricultural Marketing Boards prior 
1994 and a combination of Abstract of Agricultural Statistics and producer organizations for the 
post 1994 years. All export realization figures for the fruit exports were obtained from producer 
organizations. 
 
Wholesale product prices  
Margins are based on actual industry processing cost data for maize meal, sunflower oil, 
wheat flour and sugar - all contained in the BFAP database. 
Sugar wholesale prices are weighted average price of white and brown (f.o.r Durban). 
Prices for 1961-69 are estimated using the average 1970-05 margin between the retail and the 
processor selling price. 
Rates of assistance for processed sunflower oil are based on the crude oil price on the 
Reef (Gauteng). The crude oil price is estimated from Retail price data (from Statistics South 
Africa) using 2003 margins provided in the Food price monitoring committee report (2003) 
Wheat flour wholesale prices were estimated due to lack of official data. We converted 
the cake flour retail price (Statistics SA) to bread flour using relative extraction rates (0.7 for 
cake flour, 0.76 for white flour, 0.81 for brown bread flour).  GST and VAT were deducted to 
obtain the Retail price excluding tax. We assumed 14 percent retail margin to obtain Wholesale 
price of flour. The retail price of flour is estimated using cake flour retail prices (Statistics SA) 
benchmarked on 2000-03 wheat chain analysis prepared for the Food Pricing Monitoring 
Committee (NAMC, 2003). 
White maize flour wholesale prices are estimated using retail price data for 2.5kg bag of 
maize (Statistics SA) and margins derived from the maize chain analysis over 2000-03 prepared 
for the Food Pricing Monitoring Committee (NAMC, 2003). 
Sunflower crude oil price (at Reef) is estimated from Retail price data (Statistics SA_ 
using 2003 margins provided in the Food price monitoring committee report (2003).  
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Wholesale prices for the remaining products are obtained from the producer 
organizations or the Abstract of Agricultural Statistics. 
 
Border prices  
The calculation for fob and cif prices varied according to the most reliable source of the 
international reference prices. The main task was to find a comparable reference price and then 
to adjust for transport and handling margins to obtain fob or cif prices. International shipping 
rates for the major commodities were used for this purpose.  
For grains, mutton and sugar IFS world prices were mainly used. In other cases the prices 
were calculated as the value of the country‟s exports or imports divided by the volume of that 
trade. Due to the unreliable results generated by some of these methods we in a few cases such as 
beef and grapes took an average of the most representative world price series and the calculated 
unit value of exports or imports.  
In some cases (like poultry) we used FAOSTAT (1961-1993) and the recent OECD PSE 
database on South Africa to complete the series. 
In the case of poultry the world export price derived from FAOSTAT is used for 1961-
1993. This is then adjusted, using the gap between the OECD PSE data for SA poultry (OECD, 
2006) and the World export price over period 1994-97, to adjust the World export price data to 
ensure consistency between the series. The data for 1993-2003 is taken from OECD PSE 
estimates. Border price values for 2004 and 2005 are estimated using growth rates derived from 
the international price of US poultry (International Financial Statistics). From 1998-2005, the 
border price is adjusted upwards by 15 percent to account for dumping of cheap low quality 
poultry imports. 
Selecting the appropriate international reference price for beef was the major problem we 
faced in trying to estimate the NRA for beef. The main reason for this is that South Africa does 
not import fresh or chilled beef carcasses. This only comes from Botswana and Namibia (also 
sometime imported on the hoof and slaughtered in SA). To take account of the low quality 
imports and to some extent dumping out of EU intervention stocks in certain years and also to 
take account of the increasing dominance of Argentina as country of origin recently we have 
used the average between the import unit value for beef imports into South Africa (FAOSTAT) 
and the international price for Argentinean beef (IFS) as the international reference price series. 
In this way we have automatically factored in the quality adjustment to ensure that we compare 
„beef‟ with „beef‟. 
Border prices for wheat grain are based on US HRW wheat obtained from IFS. The 
prices are adjusted downwards using a quality adjustment of 10 percent. This adjustment is 
obtained from Export Parity price calculations conducted by SAGIS. Flour export prices for SA 
are obtained from FAOSTAT data. 
Freight rates used to calculate wheat border prices for 1978-05 are for Heavy Grain, Gulf 
to Cape Town (obtained for the International Grains Council). Data for 1960-77 are inferred 
using Ocean Freight rates (Grains) from World Bank "Commodity trade and price trends" 
(1985).  
Maize is split into yellow and white maize. The border price is based on U.S. No.2 
Yellow, FOB Gulf of Mexico obtained from the IFS. The border price for yellow maize was 
adjusted to c.i.f. or fob Randfontein, depending on whether there were net imports or net exports 
in a given year. The reference price for white maize was treated differently. South Africa is one 
of the world‟s main exporters of white maize and exports primarily to Southern and Eastern  
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Africa. SA export prices are determined by the regional market. Therefore in years where there is 
a shortage of maize in the SADC region, we use the f.o.b border price for the region, which we 
have estimated as the c.i.f. Randfontein price. This is mostly applicable in the post 1990 period. 
US export unit values are used as the international reference price for flour (FAOSTAT). This 
data appears consistent with SA customs & excise fob prices from 1997.  Freight rates are 
equivalent to those used for wheat. Discharging rates and internal transport costs are obtained 
from SAGIS.  
To obtain the international reference price raw sugar export prices (f.o.b. from Abstract of 
Agricultural Statistics 2006) are converted to refined sugar equivalent using the average ratio of 
processed sugar exports to raw sugar exports (calculated using Customs and Excise data from 
1988-2004). No data are available on sugar cane export prices. These are estimated by adjusting 
the refined export price of sugar downwards using SA processing margins and the relevant 
conversion rates.
17 
The traded commodity in the case of sunflower seed is really sunflower oil and sunflower 
oil cake. Sunflower seed was classified as a non-tradable for the period under review. FAOSTAT 
trade data are used to determine whether sunflower oil should be considered an exportable or 
importable for each of the years. Crude sunflower oil export prices for Argentina (FAOSTAT) 
are used for the international reference price, except from 1969-77 where the United Kingdom 
export price (International Financial Statistics) is used. Export prices for 2004-05 are estimated 
using growth rates of EU sunflower oil prices obtained from South African Grain Information 
Service (SAGIS). Freight and discharging costs are obtained for 2000-05 from SAGIS. 
Discharging costs are backdated using the South African Producer Price Index (SA Reserve 
Bank). Freight costs are backdated using the estimated rates for heavy grain (Gulf to Cape Town) 
(see above).  
We use the export realization price obtained from the Abstract of Agricultural Statistics 
for apples, oranges and grapes. For grapes and apples, export prices over the period 1960-65 and 
1974 are estimated using the price of non-traded grapes and apples respectively. The data from 
1975 are shifted one period ahead to correspond with seasons (Oct-Sept), i.e. 1975 = Oct74-
Sept75. Export prices for oranges over period 1961-69 are estimated using orange data obtained 
from Department of Agriculture. 
 
Exchange rates 
Official exchange rates are from the South African Reserve Bank. Parallel exchange rates 
are assumed to be not applicable because no commodity traded at those exchange rates.  
 
Production, consumption, input and trade taxes and subsidies  
These are from various government policy documents and also budget reports of the 
Department of Agriculture. Tariff data are obtained from Edwards (2005). 
 
List of data sources 
 
                                                 
17 Based on Table 7.3 “Food pricing monitoring committee report, 2003” (NAMC, 2003). We use average for 
1988-03 for out of period years. Includes discounts, rebates, packing costs, marketing & distribution, 
warehousing & handling, working capital cost plus milling and refining costs plus SASA levy.  
 
4 
Anderson, K., M. Kurzweil, W. Martin, D. Sandri and E. Valenzuela (2008), “Methodology for 
Measuring Distortions to Agricultural Incentives,” Agricultural Distortions Working Paper 
02, World Bank, Washington DC, revised January. 
BFAP (2006), Database of the South African grain and livestock partial equilibrium model. 
Bureau for Food and Agricultural Policy (BFAP), University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South 
Africa.  
Department of Agriculture (various years), Abstract of Agricultural Statistics. Department of 
Agriculture, Pretoria, South Africa  
Edwards, L. (2005), “Has South Africa Liberalised its Trade?”, South African Journal of 
Economics 73(4). 
FAOSTAT (2006), Food and Agriculture Organization Statistics Databases. Available at: 
//faostat.fao.org. Accessed June 2006. 
FAO (1996), Trade Yearbook 1996, Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization. 
IMF (2006 and earlier years), International Financial Statistics, Washington DC: International 
Monetary Fund (annual). 
National Agricultural Marketing Council (NAMC) (2003), Food Pricing Monitoring Committee: 
Final Report, Pretoria: NAMC. 
OECD (2006), OECD Review of Agricultural policies: South Africa, Paris: Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development. 
South African Grain Information Service, http://www.sagis.org.za/ 
South African Reserve Bank (various years), Quarterly Bulletin of Statistics. Pretoria. 
Statistics South Africa (various years), Statistical release: P3051.1  
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Appendix Figure 1: Consumer tax equivalent, primary and processed agriculture, South Africa, 
1966 to 2005 
(percent, three-year moving average) 
 





























































































Primary Agriculture Processed products (lightly & highly)




Source: Authors‟ spreadsheet  
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Appendix Figure 2: Nominal rates of assistance, field crops, South Africa, 1961 to 2005 
(percent, three-year moving average) 
 
Direct rate of assistance, Field crops











































































Yellow Maize grain White Maize grain Wheat grain Sunflower seed
 
Source: Authors‟ spreadsheet  
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Appendix Figure 3: Nominal rates of assistance, meat products, South Africa, 1961 to 2005 
(percent, three-year moving average) 
Direct rate of assistance, Meat products











































































Source: Authors‟ spreadsheet  
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Appendix Figure 4: Nominal rates of assistance, exportable fruit and sugar, South Africa, 1961 
to 2005 
(percent, three-year moving average) 
Direct rate of assistance, Fruit and Sugar exports











































































Apples Table grapes Oranges Raw sugar
 
Source: Authors‟ spreadsheet  
 
9 
Appendix Figure 5: Nominal rates of assistance, processed foods, South Africa, 1961 to 2005 
(percent, three-year moving average) 
 
 
Direct rate of assistance, Processed products





































































































White Maize flour Refined sugar Wheat flour Sunflower oil
 
 
Source: Authors‟ spreadsheet  
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Appendix Table 1: Basic economic indicators, South Africa, 1065 to 2004 
  Year  1965  1975  1985  1995  2004 
Population  Population total (mill)  20  25  31  39  46 
Proportion rural ( percent)  53  52  52  47  43 
GDP  GDP (Current US$ mill)  10971  36948  67066  151113  212777 
GDP per capita (current US$)  553  1494  2142  3863  4675 
Share GDP  Agriculture ( percent)  9  8  5  4  3 
Industry ( percent)  40  41  44  35  32 
Manufacturing ( percent)  23  23  22  21  20 
































Number employed in agriculture (1000)
 1  2512  2280  1921  1868  1616 
Agricultural land (1000 ha)  97262  95132  94547  99525  99640 
Arable land area (1000 ha)  12200  12570  12355  14915  14753 
Arable land (hectares per person)
 1  0.6  0.5  0.4  0.4  0.3 
Arable Land by Agriculture worker
 1  4.9  5.5  6.4  8.0  9.1 
Crop and pasture Land per capita
 1  4.9  3.8  3.0  2.5  2.2 
Agricultural value added/worker (US$)









Total goods & services exports (US$ mill)  2905  10207  18183  34703  56327 
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)  26  28  31  23  27 
Total Merchandise Exports (US$ mill)  2547  8770  16424  30007  47290 
Agricultural, fishing & Forestry (US$ mill)    831  554  970  1569 
Food exports (US$ mill)    771  707  1160  1694 
Other Manufactures exports (US$ mill)    2259  4667  15526  29602 
Mining exports (US$ mill)    4909  10496  12352  14425 
Agricultural (percent merchandise exports)    9  3  3  3 
Food(percent merchandise exports)    9  4  4  4 
Manufactures (percent merchandise exports)    26  28  52  63 









Total goods & services imports (US$ mill)  3027  11143  12921  33386  58560 
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)  28  30  23  22  27 
Total Merchandise Imports (US$ mill)  2563  10001  11665  29933  53090 
Agricultural, fishing & Forestry (US$ mill)    155  235  835  962 
Food imports (US$ mill)    300  517  1326  2002 
Other Manufacturing imports (US$ mill)    7839  8895  24626  42663 
Mining imports (US$ mill)    1707  2019  3145  7463 
Agricultural (percent merchandise imports)    2  2  3  2 
Food (percent merchandise imports    3  4  4  4 
Manufactures (percent merchandise imports)    78  76  82  80 
Mining (percent of merchandise imports)    17  17  11  14 
1. Values for the previous year 
Source: World Bank (2007) and, for trade data, Quantech (2005) 
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Appendix Table 2: Agricultural subsidies, South Africa, 1950 to 2000 
Programme  Type/details  1950s  1960s  1970s  1980s  1990s 
Interest Subsidies    33,500  1,833,400  52,355,000  637,780,074  619,268,000 
Water Quota Subsidies          144,977,700  20,777,800 
Subsidy on Railway Rates  Grants/Subsidy  5,860,000  0  0  0  0 
Subsidy on Fertilizers  Grants/Subsidy  15,300,000  61,900,000  158,100,000  49,500,000  0 
Subsidy on Railway Rates for 
Manure & Fertilizer 
Grants/Subsidy  2,850,000  17,975,000  9,500,000  0  0 
Soil conservation  Grants/Subsidy  44,500  12,282,300  0  48,175,981  61,576,000 
Distress relief    0  500,000  8,805,000  547,284,000  1,325,094,000 
Payment to cooperatives and the 
state guarantee scheme 
State provided guarantee 
to farm credit at the 
agricultural cooperatives 
      168,418,000  1,161,371610 
Food price stabilization    0  0  20,000,000  0  0 
Crop insurance    0  0  5,000,000  7, 318,000  0 
Livestock  Payment to SAR&H 
Administration for 
outstanding promissory 
notes for transport of stock 
from and fodder to 
drought stricken areas 
6,000  5,524,000  0  0  0 
stock feed and grazing  0  6,800,000  10,700,000  486,900,000  521,397,000 
Subsidy on Railway Rates 
for Fodder & Livestock 
under drought relief 
scheme  
22,600,000  34,600,000  26,800,000  74,036,000  53,562,000 
Dairy Products  Subsidy on Dairy Products 
from South West Africa 
48,700  0  0  0  0 
Subsidy on Butter  23,760,000  41,900,000  70,042,000  12,701,000  0 
Wheat  Duty on Imported Wheat  2,617,000  0  0  0  0 
Price Stabilization of 
Bread 
97,061,000  175,122,000  520,502,000  1,316,349,980  60,000,000 
Subsidy on Imported 
Wheat and Flour 
11,664,000  24,000  0  0  0 
Loss of shipment of 
Canadian Wheat during 
1949/50 
262,000  0  0  0  0 
Maize  Expenses for the 
stabilization of the price of 
maize 
44,253,200  101,001,400  257,600,000  819,634,000  1,532,400,000 
Subsidy on railway rates 
for maize & Maize 
Products 
2,345,000  37,416,300  28,300,000     
Handling and Storage of 
maize 
8,000  8000  0  0  0 
Duty on Imported Maize  482,000  0  0  0  0 
Subsidy on Maize & 
Maize products 
3,784,300  2,624,300  0  0  0 
Subsidy on Imported Oats 
and Barley 
400  0  0  0  0 
Oats & Barley  Duty on Imported Oats 
and Barley 
66,500  200  0  0  0 
Subsidy on Sunflower 
Seed & Cake 
497,000  0  0  0  0 
Oilbearing Seeds  Subsidy on Groundnut 
Cake & Oil 
225,000  0  0  0  0 
Distribution of Wool Profits    5,000,000  0  2,003,000  0  0 
Industry Assistance: Fruit    0  0  1,275,000  3,225,000  0 
Industry assistance: Grain sorghum    0  2,356,000  4,756,000  3,900,000  0 
Industry Assistance: Citrus    0  1,850,000  0  0  0  
 
12 
Industry Assistance: Wool  0  2,500,000  13,000,000       
Assistance to municipal markets    0  2,325,000  628,000  0 
Source: Compiled from various budget reports of the South African Department of Agriculture.  
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Appendix Table 3: Financial aid to South African farmers in the 1980s 
 
Program  Purpose  Funding history 
Purchase of agricultural 
land 
To enable a farmer who does not own agricultural 
land to acquire his own land and/or to enable a farmer 
to make his existing property and economic unit or 
more economical 
R40 million during 1981 – 
1992 then suspended 
Consolidation of debt  For the payment of pressing farming debts to a farmer 
who experiences problems due to circumstances 
beyond this control and who cannot obtain assistance 
elsewhere 
R499 million between 1981 
and 1992 
To bring about 
improvement 
To enable a farmer to improve his property and 
operate his enterprise on a more economical basis 
R3.5 million between 1981 
and 1990 and then 
suspended 
Purchase of implements 
and vehicles 
To enable a farmer to operate his enterprise 
economically with the necessary implements and 
vehicles 
R 1.2 million between 1981 
and 1991 and then 
suspended 
Purchase of livestock  To enable a farmer to purchase additional livestock or 
to incorporate the livestock factor in his enterprise 
R5.5 million between 1981 
and 1992 
Means of crop 
production 
To enable a farmer who, as a result of adverse 
farming conditions, cannot acquire assistance 
elsewhere, to produce a crop 
R765 million spent 
between 1981 and 1992 
Farm laborers‟ housing  Loans to create better housing facilities for permanent 
farm laborers to promote a better relationship 
between the farmer and the laborers 
R52 million between 1981 
and 1990 and then 
suspended 
Erection of waterworks  To construct approved waterworks to enable a farmer 
to make better use of his land 
R23 million between 1991 
and 1992 
Sinking of boreholes  To enable a farmer to sink boreholes for livestock and 
domestic purposes 
R423 000 between 1981 – 
1986 – suspended 
Erection of soil 
conservation works 
The financing of essential soil conservation works, 
such as planned and approved by the Directorate of 
Resource Protection, to improve and protect the soil 
R16 million between 1981 
and 1992 
Flood disaster loans  To enable farmers to return to the position they held 
prior to the flood damage 
R10.6 million between 
1981 and 1992 
Stock feed loans  Loans to enable farmers to maintain a nucleus herd 
during an extended drought 
R88 million between 1981 
and 1990 
Interest on carry-over 
debt and prodn. credit 
  R1059 million between 
1981 and 1992 
Subsidies on farm bond 
interest and interest on 
consolidated agricultural 
debt 
Mainly on consolidated debt between 1987 and 1992  R99 million between 1981 
and 1992 
Stock feed purchases and 
incentives 
  R443.5 million between 
1981 and 1992 
Subsidies on the 
transport of stock feed 
  R72 million between 1981 
and 1992 
Flood disaster subsidies  To enable farmers to return to the same position 
which they held prior to the flood damage 
R267 million: 1981 – 1992 
Water quota subsidies  To enable farmers on irrigation scheme, where water 
is no longer adequate/available to survive and to keep 
their farm laborers in their employ and to prevent 
collapse of the infrastructure of the town or region 
R15.6 million between 
1981 and 1992 
Conversion of marginal 
lands 
To enable farmers to convert marginal ploughed lands 
where crop production is risky to convert to cultivated 
pastures by establishing permanent pasture crops 
R125.6 million between 






Subsidizing the production inputs of farmers in 
certain areas where there were crop failures as a result 
of drought in 1987/88 to enable them to again 
purchase production inputs in the 1988/89 season 
R104 million 
TOTAL    R3 912 million 
 
Source: Authors‟ compilation from official documents  
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Appendix Table 4: Prices and NRAs for primary products, South Africa, 1960 to 2005 
 
  Yellow Maize  White Maize  Wheat 


























   NRA = 
DP-BP 
BP 
1960                         
1961  34.3  29.2  X  0.17  33.6  33.0  X  0.02  60.4  59.2  M  0.02 
1962  31.0  29.8  X  0.04  30.2  33.7  X  -0.11  59.7  60.2  M  -0.01 
1963  32.5  33.4  X  -0.03  31.0  37.7  X  -0.18  60.2  64.9  M  -0.07 
1964  34.2  33.9  X  0.01  32.6  38.3  X  -0.15  63.3  64.7  M  -0.02 
1965  35.9  34.1  X  0.05  34.2  38.6  X  -0.11  63.3  60.0  M  0.06 
1966  40.3  35.9  X  0.12  39.3  40.5  X  -0.03  66.6  60.8  M  0.10 
1967  37.5  33.1  X  0.14  36.4  37.4  X  -0.02  70.0  64.4  M  0.09 
1968  37.7  28.4  X  0.33  36.0  32.1  X  0.12  70.0  60.8  M  0.15 
1969  41.1  31.4  X  0.31  39.2  36.0  M  0.09  70.0  59.0  M  0.19 
1970  39.8  35.6  X  0.12  37.7  40.2  X  -0.06  72.4  62.7  M  0.16 
1971  42.2  35.4  X  0.19  37.9  40.0  X  -0.05  73.5  60.7  M  0.21 
1972  45.3  36.1  X  0.25  39.0  40.9  X  -0.05  75.8  40.5  X  0.87 
1973  51.4  59.7  X  -0.14  43.5  67.4  X  -0.36  83.4  77.8  X  0.07 
1974  64.4  80.6  X  -0.20  47.0  91.0  X  -0.48  95.9  98.8  X  -0.03 
1975  70.1  77.8  X  -0.10  50.0  88.0  X  -0.43  107.6  86.8  X  0.24 
1976  73.5  85.5  X  -0.14  59.0  96.6  X  -0.39  123.9  89.9  X  0.38 
1977  83.6  69.7  X  0.20  71.5  78.7  X  -0.09  124.0  65.6  X  0.89 
1978  94.9  73.1  X  0.30  83.1  82.7  X  0.01  141.6  83.0  X  0.71 
1979  115.4  80.9  X  0.43  102.2  91.4  X  0.12  188.1  101.9  X  0.85 
1980  138.6  79.5  X  0.74  122.7  89.8  X  0.37  220.0  202.9  M  0.08 
1981  151.6  93.4  X  0.62  134.2  105.6  X  0.27  246.7  227.9  M  0.08 
1982  175.2  93.8  X  0.87  155.3  106.0  X  0.47  280.0  128.2  X  1.18 
1983  192.2  222.1  M  -0.13  170.1  140.8  X  0.21  280.4  126.8  X  1.21 
1984  248.0  287.9  M  -0.14  224.5  325.4  X  -0.31  303.0  167.6  X  0.81 
1985  250.2  215.3  X  0.16  246.6  423.4  M  -0.42  329.2  231.5  X  0.42 
1986  320.5  161.6  X  0.98  308.9  185.8  M  0.66  364.9  190.3  X  0.92 
1987  359.3  112.9  X  2.18  310.0  127.5  X  1.43  398.3  157.0  X  1.54 
1988  325.4  192.8  X  0.69  322.0  416.1  X  -0.23  400.3  237.3  X  0.69 
1989  302.8  233.8  X  0.30  354.0  264.2  X  0.34  450.0  618.9  M  -0.27 
1990  342.0  219.2  X  0.56  393.0  247.8  X  0.59  562.6  532.8  M  0.06 
1991  404.1  226.6  X  0.78  464.0  256.1  X  0.81  648.4  551.1  M  0.18 
1992  502.9  484.1  M  0.04  530.0  547.1  X  -0.03  743.5  641.2  M  0.16 
1993  471.2  253.3  X  0.86  545.0  614.3  X  -0.11  802.5  691.0  M  0.16 
1994  461.5  296.7  X  0.56  461.5  335.6  X  0.38  884.6  791.7  M  0.12 
1995  677.7  351.1  X  0.93  677.7  794.0  M  -0.15  969.6  909.0  M  0.07 
1996  722.4  592.5  X  0.22  677.4  678.5  X  0.00  1099.4  1152.2  M  -0.05 
1997  673.2  785.4  M  -0.14  873.6  476.5  X  0.83  947.6  997.8  M  -0.05 
1998  621.6  852.9  M  -0.27  710.7  959.5  X  -0.26  919.9  1000.3  M  -0.08 
1999  783.5  872.4  M  -0.10  797.4  969.6  X  -0.18  1127.4  1019.4  M  0.11 
2000  667.3  479.7  X  0.39  642.8  533.9  X  0.20  1357.3  1134.8  M  0.20 
2001  956.6  622.9  X  0.54  948.1  1298.9  X  -0.27  1562.3  1502.0  M  0.04 
2002  1449.1  1475.3  M  -0.02  1795.6  1656.7  X  0.08  1991.3  2010.7  M  -0.01 
2003  974.3  1211.9  M  -0.20  955.6  1363.1  X  -0.30  1664.5  1519.8  M  0.10 
2004  946.4  1183.6  M  -0.20  919.1  1319.5  X  -0.30  1654.5  1444.5  M  0.15 





Appendix Table 4 (continued): Prices and NRAs for primary products, South Africa, 1960 to 
2005 
 
  Poultry  Beef  Mutton 
























   NRA = 
DP-BP 
BP 
1960                           
1961      M  -0.13  239.4  285.3  M  -0.16  355.2  376.1  M  -0.06 
1962      M  -0.13  256.0  184.8  M  0.39  412.3  301.7  M  0.37 
1963      M  -0.13  257.3  216.4  M  0.19  440.5  374.7  M  0.18 
1964      M  -0.13  334.9  380.3  M  -0.12  455.0  351.5  M  0.29 
1965      M  -0.13  344.6  326.1  M  0.06  431.0  385.0  M  0.12 
1966      M  -0.13  376.3  333.0  M  0.13  484.0  423.4  M  0.14 
1967      M  -0.13  429.2  338.5  M  0.27  469.0  417.1  M  0.12 
1968      M  -0.13  427.3  349.6  M  0.22  439.0  395.7  M  0.11 
1969      M  -0.13  404.3  354.1  M  0.14  469.0  396.3  M  0.18 
1970  395.2  570.9  M  -0.31  448.6  436.7  M  0.03  511.0  452.1  M  0.13 
1971  482.0  568.5  M  -0.15  449.0  435.1  M  0.03  633.0  383.2  M  0.65 
1972  578.3  685.4  M  -0.16  444.0  444.7  M  0.00  832.0  461.9  M  0.80 
1973  780.8  864.0  M  -0.10  586.0  609.4  M  -0.04  963.0  723.5  M  0.33 
1974  780.8  843.8  M  -0.07  807.0  678.4  M  0.19  1111.0  1018.8  M  0.09 
1975  790.4  1005.6  M  -0.21  893.0  552.5  M  0.62  1182.0  710.0  M  0.66 
1976  805.8  1230.1  M  -0.34  872.0  621.5  M  0.40  1293.0  782.7  M  0.65 
1977  911.3  1282.1  M  -0.29  936.0  698.9  M  0.34  1192.0  838.9  M  0.42 
1978  1062.0  1355.1  M  -0.22  935.0  627.3  M  0.49  1209.0  1050.9  M  0.15 
1979  1208.8  1380.3  M  -0.12  969.0  1098.1  M  -0.12  1443.0  1356.0  M  0.06 
1980  1614.0  1341.2  M  0.20  1190.0  1348.8  M  -0.12  1950.0  1329.9  M  0.47 
1981  1735.0  1413.8  M  0.23  2024.0  1155.7  M  0.75  2137.0  1574.2  M  0.36 
1982  1610.0  1519.5  M  0.06  2122.0  1225.0  M  0.73  2069.0  1925.1  M  0.07 
1983  1814.0  1383.0  M  0.31  2114.0  1199.9  M  0.76  2334.0  1642.6  M  0.42 
1984  2128.2  1904.9  M  0.12  2229.0  1503.2  M  0.48  2563.0  2339.1  M  0.10 
1985  2173.8  2765.7  M  -0.21  2284.0  2080.6  M  0.10  3087.0  3244.0  M  -0.05 
1986  2890.1  3315.8  M  -0.13  2573.0  2943.0  M  -0.13  3840.0  2839.7  M  0.35 
1987  3378.6  3089.0  M  0.09  3534.0  3776.0  M  -0.06  4744.2  2716.9  M  0.75 
1988  4064.2  3455.3  M  0.18  4516.0  4151.1  M  0.09  5311.0  3458.5  M  0.54 
1989  3835.6  4138.9  M  -0.07  4826.0  4606.4  M  0.05  5036.0  4858.5  M  0.04 
1990  4366.7  4519.3  M  -0.03  4736.0  4337.2  M  0.09  4786.0  4349.0  M  0.10 
1991  4851.4  5046.3  M  -0.04  4749.0  5348.4  M  -0.11  5645.0  4346.7  M  0.30 
1992  5361.7  5090.3  M  0.05  5220.0  6763.4  M  -0.23  6216.0  4428.7  M  0.40 
1993  6231.7  5174.7  M  0.20  5219.0  8612.5  M  -0.39  7711.0  5496.4  M  0.40 
1994  6980.8  6137.9  M  0.14  7283.0  7160.1  M  0.02  8771.0  6056.4  M  0.45 
1995  7110.8  6157.2  M  0.15  7468.0  7459.1  M  0.00  8261.0  6264.8  M  0.32 
1996  8159.2  6820.0  M  0.20  7855.0  6887.7  M  0.14  10573.0  9418.5  M  0.12 
1997  8380.8  6927.7  M  0.21  8208.0  6865.1  M  0.20  10645.0  8529.6  M  0.25 
1998  8028.3  7750.4  M  0.04  7997.3  9650.8  M  -0.17  10126.0  8248.8  M  0.23 
1999  8220.8  7836.4  M  0.05  7868.0  9771.4  M  -0.19  13002.0  10388.2  M  0.25 
2000  8530.0  8669.9  M  -0.02  8379.1  11136.0  M  -0.25  14624.0  9669.8  M  0.51 
2001  9780.0  11489.3  M  -0.15  8376.8  11411.5  M  -0.27  15223.0  15275.0  M  0.00 
2002  11580.0  12859.6  M  -0.10  10259.4  13930.4  M  -0.26  18181.0  23650.1  M  -0.23 
2003  12390.0  10287.3  M  0.20  12775.0  10691.6  M  0.19  20120.0  21537.8  M  -0.07 
2004  12018.5  10047.4  M  0.20  13255.0  12211.0  M  0.09  21000.0  21617.5  M  -0.03 
2005  11817.7  9652.8  M  0.22  14363.0  12448.3  M  0.15  22000.0  20724.4  M  0.06 
Notes: NRA for poultry over period 1961-69 is equivalent to the average NRA for poultry over 
period 1970-81.  
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Appendix Table 4 (continued): Prices and NRAs for primary products, South Africa, 1960 to 
2005 
 
  Apples Exportable  Oranges Exportable  Grapes Exportable 
























   NRA = 
DP-BP 
BP 
1961  127.9  134.2  X  -0.05  86.2  88.5  X  -0.03  210.6  240.2  X  -0.12 
1962  136.3  143.8  X  -0.05  77.8  80.1  X  -0.03  238.3  296.9  X  -0.20 
1963  123.7  145.3  X  -0.15  81.6  80.1  X  0.02  251.1  241.9  X  0.04 
1964  137.7  137.3  X  0.00  64.7  87.2  X  -0.26  255.3  273.2  X  -0.07 
1965  132.1  140.8  X  -0.06  65.2  85.4  X  -0.24  251.1  297.7  X  -0.16 
1966  166.1  163.3  X  0.02  64.4  68.6  X  -0.06  250.0  310.3  X  -0.19 
1967  113.3  153.8  X  -0.26  62.3  71.9  X  -0.13  252.0  294.4  X  -0.14 
1968  189.5  180.0  X  0.05  65.0  74.1  X  -0.12  302.0  298.1  X  0.01 
1969  159.9  152.1  X  0.05  74.6  113.2  X  -0.34  326.0  310.9  X  0.05 
1970  153.7  158.1  X  -0.03  67.9  120.0  X  -0.43  329.6  305.4  X  0.08 
1971  134.8  156.0  X  -0.14  83.2  130.4  X  -0.36  334.2  368.4  X  -0.09 
1972  235.7  167.8  X  0.40  85.7  185.3  X  -0.54  443.1  324.3  X  0.37 
1973  151.7  152.9  X  -0.01  89.2  166.9  X  -0.47  446.3  332.2  X  0.34 
1974  166.8  188.9  X  -0.12  106.5  136.2  X  -0.22  518.7  427.3  X  0.21 
1975  163.7  205.2  X  -0.20  122.1  167.5  X  -0.27  696.1  501.5  X  0.39 
1976  163.7  246.2  X  -0.34  122.1  141.7  X  -0.14  696.1  572.7  X  0.22 
1977  281.4  225.3  X  0.25  111.9  231.2  X  -0.52  723.9  700.0  X  0.03 
1978  320.6  320.7  X  0.00  199.0  233.0  X  -0.15  944.4  701.2  X  0.35 
1979  247.2  325.5  X  -0.24  195.8  298.3  X  -0.34  879.5  1130.5  X  -0.22 
1980  290.2  341.4  X  -0.15  236.9  206.9  X  0.15  978.6  1086.9  X  -0.10 
1981  211.8  411.7  X  -0.49  182.2  272.8  X  -0.33  832.9  1253.0  X  -0.34 
1982  512.3  484.0  X  0.06  232.7  322.5  X  -0.28  1037.5  1524.1  X  -0.32 
1983  393.0  450.0  X  -0.13  264.9  285.6  X  -0.07  962.7  1341.7  X  -0.28 
1984  443.6  528.6  X  -0.16  266.4  350.1  X  -0.24  1060.8  1199.4  X  -0.12 
1985  646.1  522.8  X  0.24  434.4  703.5  X  -0.38  1336.9  1112.1  X  0.20 
1986  955.9  765.7  X  0.25  580.0  624.1  X  -0.07  2323.5  1254.4  X  0.85 
1987  883.8  637.4  X  0.39  537.7  650.2  X  -0.17  2381.7  1491.6  X  0.60 
1988  747.2  905.5  X  -0.17  491.0  812.7  X  -0.40  2707.8  1118.4  X  1.42 
1989  924.8  976.6  X  -0.05  669.0  600.8  X  0.11  2723.0  2559.0  X  0.06 
1990  1791.0  1619.5  X  0.11  709.6  726.1  X  -0.02  3051.5  2811.6  X  0.09 
1991  1913.8  1825.6  X  0.05  850.3  926.4  X  -0.08  3365.8  3054.6  X  0.10 
1992  1598.4  1714.8  X  -0.07  988.0  948.8  X  0.04  3868.9  2151.4  X  0.80 
1993  927.7  948.1  X  -0.02  894.9  1051.3  X  -0.15  4496.0  4379.9  X  0.03 
1994  2130.2  1538.7  X  0.38  1192.7  1201.3  X  -0.01  4556.4  4318.2  X  0.06 
1995  1720.6  1773.9  X  -0.03  1120.2  1168.9  X  -0.04  4881.1  4080.7  X  0.20 
1996  2597.8  2404.2  X  0.08  1647.8  1345.0  X  0.23  5021.0  4341.4  X  0.16 
1997  2191.9  2296.1  X  -0.05  1501.5  1434.7  X  0.05  5698.8  4437.2  X  0.28 
1998  2420.1  2444.5  X  -0.01  1409.3  1691.6  X  -0.17  6935.5  5277.3  X  0.31 
1999  1467.8  2289.8  X  -0.36  1828.8  1690.7  X  0.08  7493.9  5733.7  X  0.31 
2000  2191.5  2145.8  X  0.02  1964.1  1523.8  X  0.29  6372.1  5891.2  X  0.08 
2001  2159.0  2403.3  X  -0.10  1202.2  1432.4  X  -0.16  9231.7  6200.1  X  0.49 
2002  3440.9  3256.6  X  0.06  2126.7  1681.8  X  0.26  6427.5  6287.4  X  0.02 
2003  3245.7  3184.8  X  0.02  2058.6  1902.1  X  0.08  6760.7  6879.2  X  -0.02 
2004  3793.6  3707.3  X  0.02  2265.3  2068.6  X  0.10  7440.6  7577.8  X  -0.02 




Appendix Table 4 (continued): Prices and NRAs for primary products, South Africa, 1960 to 
2005 
 
  Sugar Cane  Sunflower 















   NRA 
1960                  
1961  4.5  3.2  X  0.41  52.2    H  0.09 
1962  4.4  3.1  X  0.41  52.2    H  0.23 
1963  5.8  4.1  X  0.41  59.3    H  0.24 
1964  5.3  3.8  X  0.41  59.3    H  0.20 
1965  4.5  3.7  X  0.22  60.5    H  0.12 
1966  5.0  3.7  X  0.36  62.0    H  0.11 
1967  4.7  2.9  X  0.61  74.6    H  0.23 
1968  5.1  3.1  X  0.64  80.9    H  0.20 
1969  5.6  4.2  X  0.34  80.0    H  0.23 
1970  6.4  5.0  X  0.27  84.6    H  0.13 
1971  5.7  6.7  X  -0.15  94.2    H  0.08 
1972  6.1  8.6  X  -0.29  104.1    H  0.14 
1973  8.9  9.5  X  -0.06  120.0    H  0.06 
1974  10.1  21.5  X  -0.53  154.5    H  -0.10 
1975  13.8  23.3  X  -0.41  183.2    H  0.00 
1976  13.1  14.8  X  -0.12  172.2    H  0.08 
1977  13.9  11.2  X  0.24  187.2    H  0.09 
1978  15.3  13.5  X  0.13  150.6    H  0.14 
1979  18.2  13.7  X  0.33  193.7    H  0.06 
1980  24.7  33.1  X  -0.25  236.7    H  0.29 
1981  22.8  21.1  X  0.08  240.0    H  0.23 
1982  25.3  15.4  X  0.65  280.8    H  0.20 
1983  33.6  13.9  X  1.42  309.0    H  0.27 
1984  27.3  17.3  X  0.58  339.0    H  0.01 
1985  30.8  18.9  X  0.63  389.0    H  -0.03 
1986  36.0  23.3  X  0.54  428.0    H  0.16 
1987  32.6  21.6  X  0.51  503.0    H  0.19 
1988  41.1  33.6  X  0.22  566.0    H  0.02 
1989  50.6  48.4  X  0.05  580.0    H  0.02 
1990  55.4  57.3  X  -0.03  672.0    H  0.08 
1991  56.8  45.5  X  0.25  722.0    H  0.18 
1992  94.7  45.3  X  1.09  780.0    H  0.13 
1993  99.9  44.7  X  1.23  843.0    H  0.01 
1994  103.7  43.1  X  1.41  978.5    H  -0.05 
1995  104.8  67.8  X  0.55  1065.6    H  -0.05 
1996  108.9  96.0  X  0.13  961.1    H  -0.07 
1997  119.1  85.1  X  0.40  1097.4    H  -0.08 
1998  125.9  97.0  X  0.30  1458.7    H  -0.15 
1999  121.4  85.7  X  0.42  1354.8    H  0.01 
2000  130.5  87.6  X  0.49  1199.0    H  -0.01 
2001  160.2  125.4  X  0.28  1963.0    H  -0.15 
2002  171.8  169.5  X  0.01  2552.0    H  -0.07 
2003  169.1  94.9  X  0.78  2353.5    H  0.00 
2004  159.6  104.4  X  0.53  2185.0    H  0.04 
2005  162.5  103.3  X  0.57  1827.7    H  0.01 
Source: Authors‟ spreadsheet  
Notes: Sunflower seeds are non-traded, while sunflower oil is traded. See Anderson et al. (2008) 
for method of calculating NRA in this case. NRA for sugar cane over period 1961-64 is 




Appendix Table 5: Prices and NRAs for lightly processed foods, South Africa, 1960 to 2005 
 














































   NRA = 
DP-BP 
BP 
1960                                 
1961  51.5  84.4  X  -0.39  80.6  135.7  X  -0.41  81.2    X  0.49  250.3  191.0  X  0.31 
1962  52.3  75.2  X  -0.30  81.2  112.0  X  -0.27  81.9    X  0.49  248.1  141.1  X  0.76 
1963  52.8  76.4  X  -0.31  80.9  135.6  X  -0.40  81.6    X  0.49  239.9  133.7  X  0.79 
1964  52.5  67.8  X  -0.23  81.7  111.7  X  -0.27  82.4    X  0.49  239.1  144.1  X  0.66 
1965  52.8  65.1  X  -0.19  85.5  106.7  X  -0.20  86.2  61.0  X  0.41  245.9  173.9  X  0.41 
1966  54.7  63.5  X  -0.14  86.3  137.5  M  -0.37  87.0  61.0  X  0.43  253.3  186.7  M  0.36 
1967  56.4  70.3  X  -0.20  91.8  161.3  M  -0.43  92.6  51.3  X  0.80  253.3  143.5  X  0.77 
1968  56.6  43.0  X  0.32  94.0  150.3  M  -0.37  94.8  53.8  X  0.76  254.8  153.5  M  0.66 
1969  57.9  60.2  X  -0.04  95.1  176.8  M  -0.46  95.9  73.3  X  0.31  263.8  149.7  M  0.76 
1970  58.5  66.8  X  -0.13  101.2  175.9  M  -0.42  102.0  82.7  X  0.23  285.1  199.7  X  0.43 
1971  59.8  71.3  X  -0.16  102.3  171.1  M  -0.40  131.9  115.3  X  0.14  291.5  227.4  X  0.28 
1972  64.9  72.3  X  -0.10  106.6  98.1  X  0.09  122.1  143.8  X  -0.15  311.6  212.0  X  0.47 
1973  72.2  76.4  X  -0.06  114.2  96.8  X  0.18  122.1  160.7  X  -0.24  338.5  283.5  X  0.19 
1974  83.2  116.6  X  -0.29  132.3  110.6  X  0.20  113.2  367.5  X  -0.69  381.9  572.2  X  -0.33 
1975  91.4  143.7  X  -0.36  163.2  189.0  X  -0.14  107.1  413.6  X  -0.74  464.1  467.2  X  -0.01 
1976  103.5  170.6  X  -0.39  185.4  146.1  X  0.27  150.0  264.6  X  -0.43  540.3  429.4  X  0.26 
1977  126.9  175.0  X  -0.27  211.6  114.1  X  0.85  112.4  194.5  X  -0.42  606.8  471.3  X  0.29 
1978  147.5  177.6  X  -0.17  230.6  179.4  M  0.29  268.1  234.0  X  0.15  653.9  430.6  X  0.52 
1979  162.9  201.6  X  -0.19  269.9  201.6  M  0.34  301.8  230.1  X  0.31  733.1  579.6  X  0.26 
1980  198.7  207.7  X  -0.04  330.2  228.4  M  0.45  338.3  548.8  X  -0.38  822.0  398.0  X  1.07 
1981  226.7  247.4  X  -0.08  382.4  302.5  M  0.26  378.7  381.6  X  -0.01  904.2  492.4  X  0.84 
1982  254.7  257.1  X  -0.01  443.0  320.7  M  0.38  424.8  265.8  X  0.60  904.2  511.4  X  0.77 
1983  291.1  286.9  X  0.01  503.5  182.0  X  1.77  466.2  257.3  X  0.81  1091.1  540.1  M  1.02 
1984  347.7  549.0  X  -0.37  553.0  265.7  X  1.08  562.7  309.6  X  0.82  1330.2  1128.6  M  0.18 
1985  400.0  726.3  X  -0.45  627.3  541.7  X  0.16  666.5  319.6  X  1.09  1614.2  1451.3  M  0.11 
1986  507.7  514.7  X  -0.01  627.3  579.1  X  0.08  788.9  402.1  X  0.96  1591.8  897.2  M  0.77 
1987  547.7  369.9  X  0.48  737.4  487.6  X  0.51  889.4  395.7  X  1.25  1442.3  760.2  M  0.90 
1988  553.8  737.2  X  -0.25  833.7  431.5  X  0.93  990.1  584.9  X  0.69  1337.7  1036.2  M  0.29 
1989  704.6  624.1  X  0.13  916.2  577.0  X  0.59  1075.1  800.3  X  0.34  1711.3  1312.2  M  0.30 
1990  824.6  515.0  X  0.60  1133.6  891.8  X  0.27  1186.7  971.3  X  0.22  1980.4  1318.5  M  0.50 
1991  950.8  473.8  X  1.01  1249.1  803.1  X  0.56  1354.6  758.9  X  0.79  2055.1  1107.4  X  0.86 
1992  1110.8  978.9  X  0.13  1554.5  866.5  X  0.79  1560.3  739.8  X  1.11  2256.9  1394.5  M  0.62 
1993  1246.2  1160.1  X  0.07  1655.4  955.3  X  0.73  1725.6  816.2  X  1.11  2219.5  1733.8  M  0.28 
1994  1255.4  963.2  X  0.30  1791.8  888.6  X  1.02  1848.4  770.8  X  1.40  2496.0  2334.7  M  0.07 
1995  1381.5  1511.4  X  -0.09  1898.1  850.8  X  1.23  2012.4  1292.4  X  0.56  2593.8  2487.7  M  0.04 
1996  1593.8  1301.0  X  0.23  2119.1  1754.2  X  0.21  2113.3  1685.9  X  0.25  2695.5  2686.4  M  0.00 
1997  1657.8  1345.7  X  0.23  2380.2  1557.1  X  0.53  2303.0  1487.0  X  0.55  2801.2  2884.5  M  -0.03 
1998  1832.4  2053.1  X  -0.11  2447.5  1561.6  X  0.57  2446.6  1599.5  X  0.53  3237.1  3951.8  M  -0.18 
1999  1910.6  2139.6  X  -0.11  2566.3  1783.0  X  0.44  2604.8  1372.4  X  0.90  3834.3  3262.1  M  0.18 
2000  1923.1  1784.3  X  0.08  2713.6  2552.1  X  0.06  2712.3  1462.2  X  0.85  3243.3  2849.7  M  0.14 
2001  1929.2  3221.5  X  -0.40  2765.4  1688.5  X  0.64  2887.1  2114.6  X  0.37  3422.7  4134.1  M  -0.17 
2002  2747.7  3785.4  X  -0.27  3324.3  2128.1  X  0.56  3201.8  2647.5  X  0.21  5238.6  5233.5  X  0.00 
2003  2747.7  2705.0  X  0.02  3568.1  1947.6  X  0.83  3238.8  1549.3  X  1.09  5395.6  4671.0  M  0.16 
2004  2538.5  2577.7  X  -0.02  3566.3  1916.5  X  0.86  3159.4  1698.1  X  0.86  5589.9  4509.0  M  0.24 
2005  2203.1  2463.2  X  -0.11  3360.9  1815.6  X  0.85  3220.1  1659.6  X  0.94  5388.1  4613.6  M  0.17 
Notes: NRA for sugar cane over period 1961-64 is equivalent to the average NRA over period 
1965-1970. 




Appendix Table 6: Official foreign exchange rate, South Africa, 1960 to 2005 
 
(Rand per US dollar) 
  Official 
rate 
1960  0.71 
1961  0.71 
1962  0.71 
1963  0.71 
1964  0.71 
1965  0.71 
1966  0.71 
1967  0.71 
1968  0.71 
1969  0.71 
1970  0.71 
1971  0.72 
1972  0.77 
1973  0.69 
1974  0.68 
1975  0.74 
1976  0.87 
1977  0.87 
1978  0.87 
1979  0.84 
1980  0.78 
1981  0.88 
1982  1.09 
1983  1.11 
1984  1.48 
1985  2.23 
1986  2.29 
1987  2.04 
1988  2.27 
1989  2.62 
1990  2.59 
1991  2.76 
1992  2.85 
1993  3.27 
1994  3.55 
1995  3.63 
1996  4.30 
1997  4.61 
1998  5.53 
1999  6.11 
2000  6.94 
2001  8.61 
2002  10.54 
2003  7.56 
2004  6.46 





Appendix Table 7: Annual distortion estimates, South Africa, 1961 to 2005  



















meat  Sugar 
Sunflo
wer  Wheat 
1961  -5  -16  -24  17  2  -3  -13  -6  33  9  2 
1962  -5  39  -30  4  -11  -3  -13  37  33  23  -1 
1963  -15  19  -10  -3  -18  2  -13  18  33  24  -7 
1964  0  -12  -19  1  -15  -26  -13  29  33  20  -2 
1965  -6  6  -27  5  -11  -24  -13  12  22  12  6 
1966  2  13  -30  12  -3  -6  -13  14  36  11  10 
1967  -26  27  -26  14  -2  -13  -13  12  61  23  9 
1968  5  22  -12  33  12  -12  -13  11  64  20  15 
1969  5  14  -9  31  9  -34  -13  18  34  23  19 
1970  -3  3  -6  12  -6  -43  -31  13  27  13  16 
1971  -14  3  -21  19  -5  -36  -15  65  -15  8  21 
1972  40  0  19  25  -5  -54  -16  80  -29  14  87 
1973  -1  -4  17  -14  -36  -47  -10  33  -6  6  7 
1974  -12  19  6  -20  -48  -22  -7  9  -53  -10  -3 
1975  -20  62  21  -10  -43  -27  -21  66  -41  0  24 
1976  -34  40  6  -14  -39  -14  -34  65  -12  8  38 
1977  25  34  -10  20  -9  -52  -29  42  24  9  89 
1978  0  49  17  30  1  -15  -22  15  13  14  71 
1979  -24  -12  -32  43  12  -34  -12  6  33  6  85 
1980  -15  -12  -22  74  37  15  20  47  -25  29  8 
1981  -49  75  -42  62  27  -33  23  36  8  23  8 
1982  6  73  -41  87  47  -28  6  7  65  20  118 
1983  -13  76  -38  -13  21  -7  31  42  142  27  121 
1984  -16  48  -23  -14  -31  -24  12  10  58  1  81 
1985  24  10  5  16  -42  -38  -21  -5  63  -3  42 
1986  25  -13  61  98  66  -7  -13  35  54  16  92 
1987  39  -6  39  218  143  -17  9  75  51  19  154 
1988  -17  9  21  69  -23  -40  18  54  22  2  69 
1989  -5  5  -7  30  34  11  -7  4  5  2  -27 
1990  11  9  -6  56  59  -2  -3  10  -3  8  6 
1991  5  -11  -4  78  81  -8  -4  30  25  18  18 
1992  -7  -23  56  4  -3  4  5  40  109  13  16 
1993  -2  -39  -11  86  -11  -15  20  40  123  1  16 
1994  38  2  -8  56  38  -1  14  45  141  -5  12 
1995  -3  0  4  93  -15  -4  15  32  55  -5  7 
1996  8  14  1  22  0  23  20  12  13  -7  -5 
1997  -5  20  12  -14  83  5  21  25  40  -8  -5 
1998  -1  -17  14  -27  -26  -17  4  23  30  -15  -8 
1999  -36  -19  14  -10  -18  8  5  25  42  1  11 
2000  2  -25  -6  39  20  29  -2  51  49  -1  20 
2001  -10  -27  49  54  -27  -16  -15  0  28  -15  4 
2002  6  -26  2  -2  8  26  -10  -23  1  -7  -1 
2003  2  19  -2  -20  -30  8  20  -7  78  0  10 
2004  2  9  -2  -19  -32  10  20  -3  53  4  15 




Appendix Table 7 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, South Africa, 1961 to 2005  
(b) Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all agricultural products, to exportable and import-
competing agricultural industries, and relative
a to non-agricultural industries    
  (percent) 
  
Total ag NRA  Ag tradables NRA 
Non-ag 
tradables 
NRA  RRA 










competing  All  Inputs  Outputs 
1961  0  0  0  2  10  -9  3  0  0 
1962  0  12  0  10  2  19  13  3  8 
1963  0  4  -4  4  -2  4  4  5  1 
1964  0  -2  -2  1  0  -4  1  4  -2 
1965  0  1  -3  3  -4  3  3  3  0 
1966  0  8  1  8  6  8  10  3  7 
1967  0  11  -1  9  6  11  12  3  8 
1968  0  16  2  15  21  11  19  3  15 
1969  0  12  1  12  13  9  15  4  12 
1970  0  1  -3  3  -1  1  4  3  2 
1971  0  4  0  5  -7  13  6  2  3 
1972  0  6  2  8  4  9  10  3  8 
1973  0  -5  -6  -3  -12  -1  -3  2  -6 
1974  0  -22  -8  -17  -35  5  -20  3  -22 
1975  0  -10  -4  -6  -26  22  -7  3  -9 
1976  0  -3  -2  -1  -13  9  -1  1  -2 
1977  0  10  3  10  12  9  13  1  9 
1978  0  14  -2  10  16  7  14  4  9 
1979  0  8  -2  6  24  -9  8  4  5 
1980  0  15  6  13  22  11  17  2  13 
1981  0  31  3  23  21  36  30  4  24 
1982  0  45  7  33  56  32  45  5  37 
1983  0  46  6  33  53  39  46  6  35 
1984  0  19  -2  13  21  14  19  8  12 
1985  0  -4  -7  -3  23  -16  -3  6  -6 
1986  0  21  0  15  58  2  21  3  17 
1987  0  42  3  30  90  11  43  4  36 
1988  0  15  -3  12  12  15  17  6  9 
1989  0  4  -5  5  19  -6  8  7  0 
1990  0  10  -3  10  24  2  14  8  7 
1991  0  10  2  10  36  -2  14  7  5 
1992  0  2  3  5  33  -3  7  8  0 
1993  0  2  3  7  24  -6  10  7  3 
1994  0  22  6  21  48  10  29  7  21 
1995  0  13  4  13  34  7  18  6  11 
1996  0  11  1  9  10  10  12  6  8 
1997  0  17  1  14  38  8  18  4  13 
1998  0  -6  -5  -5  -3  -8  -6  4  -9 
1999  0  -1  -2  -2  1  -3  -2  3  -5 
2000  0  7  2  5  26  -3  7  3  5 
2001  0  -8  -5  -7  3  -15  -8  2  -9 
2002  0  -6  0  -4  6  -12  -5  1  -6 
2003  0  6  -2  4  -3  8  5  2  1 
2004  0  3  -1  2  -6  7  3  4  -1 
2005  0  19  1  13  29  12  17  4  12 





t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables 
parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively.   
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Appendix Table 7 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, South Africa, 1961 to 2005  
(c) Value shares of primary production of covered
a and non-covered products,  (percent) 
   Apple  Beef  Grape  Maize  Orange  Poultry 
Sheepme
at  Sugar 
Sunflowe
r  Wheat 
Non-
covered  
1961  2  18  2  17  4  3  8  8  1  7  31 
1962  2  12  2  21  4  4  6  9  1  5  33 
1963  2  13  2  21  3  4  7  8  1  7  32 
1964  2  22  2  14  4  4  7  7  1  8  31 
1965  3  21  2  15  4  5  9  4  1  5  32 
1966  3  19  2  17  3  5  8  6  1  4  32 
1967  3  13  2  25  3  4  7  5  1  6  33 
1968  3  16  2  14  4  6  9  5  1  8  33 
1969  3  16  2  14  4  7  8  6  1  7  33 
1970  3  17  2  15  4  6  9  5  1  7  32 
1971  3  15  1  19  3  7  5  8  1  7  32 
1972  2  14  1  20  4  8  4  9  1  4  31 
1973  2  16  1  12  3  11  6  8  2  8  31 
1974  2  9  1  29  2  7  5  12  1  5  27 
1975  2  9  1  24  2  10  4  13  1  5  29 
1976  1  11  1  20  2  13  4  9  1  6  30 
1977  2  13  1  20  3  13  4  7  2  4  32 
1978  2  11  1  19  3  12  5  7  2  3  34 
1979  2  18  1  14  3  11  6  6  1  5  33 
1980  2  15  1  16  2  10  5  10  1  6  32 
1981  2  11  1  19  2  9  5  6  1  8  36 
1982  2  14  1  12  3  12  7  5  1  5  37 
1983  3  15  2  11  3  13  7  4  1  4  38 
1984  2  14  1  14  2  13  7  5  1  5  35 
1985  2  13  1  21  3  14  7  4  1  4  31 
1986  2  18  1  10  3  17  5  4  1  4  35 
1987  2  19  1  7  3  15  4  4  1  4  38 
1988  2  16  1  13  3  14  4  5  1  5  34 
1989  2  16  1  13  2  14  5  5  1  7  33 
1990  3  17  2  9  3  16  5  6  2  5  33 
1991  3  19  2  8  3  17  4  5  2  6  32 
1992  3  26  1  6  3  18  4  3  1  4  30 
1993  2  23  2  13  3  15  3  2  1  5  30 
1994  2  15  2  13  3  18  2  3  1  5  34 
1995  3  15  2  8  3  20  3  4  2  6  35 
1996  2  10  2  15  3  17  3  6  2  8  32 
1997  2  10  3  14  3  19  3  6  2  6  32 
1998  2  13  3  14  3  18  2  6  2  4  32 
1999  2  15  3  14  4  17  3  4  4  4  31 
2000  2  14  3  12  3  20  2  5  1  6  32 
2001  2  12  3  14  3  20  3  5  2  6  31 
2002  2  12  2  20  2  18  4  5  3  6  25 
2003  2  11  3  17  4  18  4  3  2  3  33 
2004  2  13  3  17  3  17  4  3  2  3  33 
2005  2  14  2  15  3  18  4  3  1  4  33 
a. At farmgate undistorted prices, US$ 
Source: Authors‟ spreadsheet 
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Appendix Table 8: Comparison of NRA estimates in this study and by OECD, 1994 to 2003 
(percent) 
Commodity  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003 
                                
NRA estimates based on OECD 2007 Nominal Protection Coefficient           
                                
Wheat  16.6  0.0  9.6  4.4  0.0  22.7  9.2  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Maize  0.0  23.8  0.0  8.2  0.0  3.8  0.0  0.0  34.9  0.0 
Sunflower  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  4.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Groundnuts  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Sugar  41.4  52.3  36.3  28.4  45.5  70.6  18.0  18.6  40.9  45.7 
Grapes  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Oranges  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Apples  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Milk  64.7  51.8  2.4  43.2  64.8  40.3  19.6  -11.8  15.0  18.2 
Beef & Veal  0.0  35.2  21.5  9.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Pigmeat  6.9  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  16.8 
Sheepmeat  153.0  98.5  36.1  70.8  78.4  41.0  84.6  14.7  -12.0  3.0 
Poultry  8.0  15.9  8.6  21.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Eggs  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Mean NRA, all covered products  10.4  21.2  8.0  13.3  8.8  9.7  5.4  1.4  9.8  4.0 
Standard deviation  44.0  30.0  13.3  21.2  28.0  22.6  23.1  7.2  15.3  13.2 
Other (incl. decoupled & non-
product-specific) subsidies  0.4  -2.2  0.2  0.3  0.5  0.2  0.1  0.8  -1.2  1.5 
Total support  10.8  19.0  8.2  13.6  9.2  9.9  5.5  2.2  8.6  5.5 
% coverage (at undistorted prices)  77.3  71.5  74.3  74.1  71.0  72.0  74.0  74.6  78.2  72.5 
                                
NRAs of present study                   
                                
Wheat grain  11.7  6.7  -4.6  -5.0  -8.0  10.6  19.6  4.0  -1.0  9.5 
Yellow Maize grain  55.6  93.0  21.9  -14.3  -27.1  -10.2  39.1  53.6  -1.8  -19.6 
White Maize grain  37.5  -14.6  -0.2  83.3  -25.9  -17.8  20.4  -27.0  8.4  -29.9 
Weighted average maize  46.8  24.4  8.4  19.8  -26.4  -15.0  27.2  -8.1  4.3  -26.5 
Sunflower seed  -5.1  -5.0  -6.8  -8.3  -15.4  1.2  -0.6  -15.0  -7.0  0.2 
Raw sugar  140.6  54.7  13.5  40.0  29.8  41.7  48.9  27.7  1.4  78.2 
Table grapes export  -8.2  4.0  0.6  11.7  14.3  13.7  -5.9  48.9  2.2  -1.7 
Oranges export  -0.7  -4.2  22.5  4.7  -16.7  8.2  28.9  -16.1  26.4  8.2 
Apples export  38.4  -3.0  8.1  -4.5  -1.0  -35.9  2.1  -10.2  5.7  1.9 
Beef  1.7  0.1  14.0  19.6  -17.1  -19.5  -24.8  -26.6  -26.4  19.5 
Mutton  44.8  31.9  12.3  24.8  22.8  25.2  51.2  -0.3  -23.1  -6.6 
Poultry  13.7  15.5  19.6  21.0  3.6  4.9  -1.6  -14.9  -10.0  20.4 
Mean NRA, all covered products  22.2  13.0  10.7  17.0  -5.5  -1.4  6.7  -7.5  -6.0  5.8 
Standard deviation  39.6  29.0  10.7  25.8  17.3  19.5  23.4  27.0  13.6  24.7 
 
Source: NRA estimates for OECD are based on Nominal Protection Coefficient estimates of the OECD (2006) 
which, unlike the Producer Support Estimate (PSE), is expressed at undistorted prices. 